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This Article posits ten first principles on which a regulatory response to the
sharing economy must rest. Given the rapid diversification of products in the
sharing economy, this Article gives particular focus to the short-term rental
market, typified by Airbnb, as one lens through which to illustrate these princi-
ples. This Article then turns to review existing regulatory responses to the shar-
ing economy. Here again, the Article focuses on regulations related to the short-
term rental market with a particular emphasis on the two strictest, existing local
government regulatory structures: those of San Francisco, California and Port-
land, Oregon. This Article next proposes a response beyond such traditional
regulatory strategies that are not well suited to regulating the sharing economy.
Instead, this Article proposes a markets-based mechanism, transferable sharing
rights, which is better suited to internalize externalities in the short-term rental
market. Finally, this Article examines the corporatization of the sharing move-
ment and the implications for regulations as sharing evolves from a peer-to-peer
enterprise to a place where established market participants seek to assert them-
selves in the sharing economy’s new domains.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The sharing economy is causing a seismic shift in the structure of retail
and service businesses. The change is coming so quickly that it is hard to
contemplate its scope. A recent report on the sharing economy found the
following, for an average day in August 2014: 157,143 Uber rides; 66,666
Lyft rides; 10 million BlaBlaCar travel miles; $2 million worth of ELance-
oDesk work; 6,666 ELance-oDesk job postings; more than 25,000 people
who earned income with TaskRabbit; 16,666 Blue Apron meals served;
1,500 Munchery meals delivered from a shared kitchen; 13 million available
Fon-shared Wifi hot spots; 100,000 items traded on Listia; 247,000 items
sold on Etsy; $285,000 of funding raised on Indiegogo; 55 campaigns suc-
cessfully funded on Kickstarter; $8.7 million granted in peer-to-peer loans
on LendingClub; a $217 average gross by HomeAway hosts; and 375,000
people staying in Airbnb rooms, up from 140,000 per day the previous year.1
None of these businesses existed a decade ago, and most did not even exist
three years ago.2
Despite this rapid growth in the sharing economy, there has been little
discussion within the academic literature of the sharing economy’s import.
There has been almost no discussion of how the sharing economy businesses
relate to existing local government regulatory structures,3 which is a surprise
given that many sharing economy businesses have violated state or local
government laws.4 This Article seeks to begin a conversation about this rap-
idly evolving part of the economy while also addressing how, or if, the mass
scale of the sharing economies’ non-compliance with local government laws
can be rectified.
1 Jeremiah Owyang, Infographic: A Day in the Life of the Collaborative Economy, WEB
STRATEGIST (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/09/29/a-day-in-the-
life-of/ [http://perma.cc/N5NN-FJQC].
2 See, e.g., About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [http://perma.cc/
R79G-FV9T] (noting that Airbnb started in 2008); About Us, UBER, https://www.uber.com/
about [http://perma.cc/4BZ2-8CG5] (noting that Uber started in 2009). See generally Jer-
emiah Owyang, Large Companies Ramp Up Adoption in the Collaborative Economy, WEB
STRATEGY BY JEREMIAH OWYANG (July 20, 2014), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2015/
07/20/large-companies-ramp-up-adoption-in-the-collaborative-economy/ [http://perma.cc/
9SVU-A836] (noting that the large-scale adoption of “collaborative economy” models by
“large corporations” increased rapidly after 2013).
3 Georgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio & John Byers, The Rise of the Sharing Economy:
Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 6 (Bos. Univ. Sch. Mgmt., Research
Paper No. 2013-16, 2015), https://www.heartland.org/sites/default/files/airbnb.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/6T6L-6HS8] (“Relatively few empirical papers have yet studied the sharing economy
and its interplay with incumbent firms offering similar goods or services. . . . As for accommo-
dation sharing, we find a large number of opinion pieces in the popular press and on blogs, but
little in the way of academic literature.”). A growing literature promises to be on the horizon.
See, e.g., Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up Restau-
rants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16 (2015).
4 Steven T. Jones & Parker Yesko, Into Thin Air, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN ONLINE (Aug. 6,
2013), http://www.sfbg.com/2013/08/06/thin-air [http://perma.cc/NQ65-9XCH].
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This Article uses the term “sharing economy” to describe this new eco-
nomic activity. Other names for the same movement include “collaborative
consumption,” “access-based consumption,” and “the mesh,” to name a
few.5 The sharing economy remains a rapidly evolving, elusive concept. As a
reference point, this Article will use the term sharing economy inclusively to
mean an “economic model where people are creating and sharing goods,
services, space and money with each other.”6
As the sharing economy is diverse, any coherent discussion requires
some focus. For this reason, this Article will use the short-term rental market
(the “STR Market”), typified by Airbnb and similar short-term rental web
platforms, as an illustration of both the issues associated with the sharing
economy and the ways in which regulation must be tailored to effectively
respond to differentiated aspects of the larger sharing economy.
Part II of this Article establishes ten “first principles” for regulating the
sharing economy. Part III evaluates existing approaches to regulating the
sharing economy. In particular, this section uses the regulatory approaches
of San Francisco, California; Portland, Oregon; and several other local gov-
ernments for the STR Market as indicative of the types of regulations local
governments are pursuing in response to the sharing economy. Part IV then
proposes a theoretical alternative method for regulating the sharing economy
through a markets-based mechanism, referred to here as a “transferable shar-
ing rights” marketplace. Finally, Part V evaluates how regulation of the
sharing economy might evolve as established, incumbent market participants
move into the new markets created by sharing economy companies.
II. FIRST PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATING THE SHARING ECONOMY
This section provides ten “first principles,”7 or building blocks, from
which a discussion about regulating the sharing economy might evolve.
5 Christopher Smolka & Christoph Hienerth, The Best of Both Worlds: Conceptualizing
Trade-offs between Openness and Closedness for Sharing Economy Models 2 (July 2014) (un-
published), http://userinnovation.mit.edu/conf2014/282115148171894989/Christo-
pher%20Smolka%20%26%20Christoph%20Hienerth%20-%20Sharing%20Economy%20-%
20Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/KTG6-HYU9].
6 See About Us, CROWD COMPANIES, http://crowdcompanies.com/about.html [http://perma
.cc/Z8LN-E4WC]. This definition is taken from a “brand council” of major corporations that
are trying to understand ways for established market participants to participate in the sharing
economy. See id. The irony of using a definition from established market participants seeking
to intervene in peer-to-peer economic exchange is not lost here, and indeed, is discussed in
depth in Part V of the Article.
7 The term “first principle” has its origin with Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but its modern
usage as a philosophical concept emerges out of the work of Rene´ Descartes. See RENE´
DESCARTES, PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY xvii–xviii (Valentine Rodger Miller & Reese P. Miller
trans., 1982) (“And these [First] Principles must meet two conditions: first, they must be so
clear and so evident that the human mind cannot doubt of their truth when it attentively consid-
ers them; and second, the knowledge of the other things must depend upon these Principles in
such a way that they may be known without the other things, but not vice versa. And then, one
must attempt to deduce from these Principles the knowledge of the things which depend upon
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None of the principles are intentionally provocative; rather, they seek to de-
fine the ways that the sharing economy is transforming commerce, which in
turn transforms the nature of the necessary regulatory response. As a result,
this section also seeks to provide the first principles on which any future
regulation must rest.
A. Principle 1: The Sharing Economy Is Differentiated and Requires a
Differentiated Regulatory Response
In the popular press, and even in academic circles, there is considerable
discussion of the sharing economy as a coherent new industry.8 Sharing
economy businesses do typically maintain certain characteristics. Most com-
monly, these businesses use an Internet-based application, often called a web
platform, which permits individuals to share or sell things where previously
the transaction costs would have prohibited such commerce. That change in
how the transactions occur tends to focus conversation on the Internet format
of the transaction; however, a regulatory response to the sharing economy
requires recognition that the types of transactions occurring differ substan-
tially in how they affect the real world and thus require a differentiated regu-
latory response. Viewed in light of the dramatic number of sharing economy
industries, the need for a differentiated response is especially evident. Con-
sider that a 2014 visualization of sharing economy companies, the “Collabo-
rative Economy Honeycomb 2.0,” places over 150 presently-incorporated,
sharing-economy companies in twelve market sectors: learning; municipal;
money; goods; health and wellness; space; food; utilities; transportation; ser-
vices; logistics; and corporate.9 Another website lists over 9,000 sharing
economy companies.10 More sharing economy companies, in even more
market sectors, emerge almost daily.
A brief review of the differences between just two large sharing econ-
omy companies makes clear the need for a diversified response. For in-
stance, an Uber patron uses the ride-sharing web platform to obtain a ride
between locations,11 while an Airbnb user employs the web platform to find
them, in such a way that there is nothing in the whole sequence of deductions which one
makes from them which is not very manifest.”). The term is used here to connote proposed
“irreducible” background concepts against which sharing economy regulation must proceed.
The necessity of this exercise, while perhaps seeming either basic or audacious, appears neces-
sary at this point in the legal literature given the paucity of attempts to otherwise address the
sharing economy and offer policy solutions.
8 See, e.g., The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013) http://www.econ-
omist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy [http://per
ma.cc/X5NM-LLZK].
9 Jeremiah Owyang, Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2—Watch it Grow, WEB STRAT-
EGIST (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/12/07/collaborative-economy-
honeycomb-2-watch-it-grow/ [http://perma.cc/YU97-MM9H].
10 MESH: THE PULSE OF THE SHARING ECONOMY, http://meshing.it [http://perma.cc/XZ65-
CWWJ] (listing 9,544 sharing economy companies in its directory as of October 2015).
11 About Us, UBER, supra note 2 (“By seamlessly connecting riders to drivers through our R
apps, we make cities more accessible, opening up more possibilities for riders and more busi-
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a short-term rental.12 The fact that the two transactions use a web platform as
a means of permitting peer-to-peer commerce does not mean that the two
transactions share other similarities, or demand similar regulatory responses.
Notably, the nature of the public health and safety concerns associated with
ride-sharing and apartment-sharing differ. With Uber, for instance, concerns
include the personal safety of the driver and passenger, as well as the vehi-
cle’s compliance with relevant safety and environmental fleet rules. With
Airbnb, similar questions about the safety of the owner or tenant, as well as
the short-term occupant need to be addressed. However, other concerns arise
in the short-term rental context, such as potential property theft and associ-
ated insurance issues, as well as issues regarding: common areas in multi-
unit buildings; compliance with rent-control, leases, and Covenants, Condi-
tions & Restrictions (“CC&Rs”) requirements; zoning and building code
compliance; tax payments; and neighborhood externalities that could include
noise, loitering, or overuse of neighborhood amenities by increasingly tran-
sient populations. None of these issues are relevant to a ride-sharing web
platform.
Because of the differences between these two industries, most major
cities have separate commissions and laws that regulate the existing taxi and
hotel industries. For instance, San Francisco maintains the San Francisco
Municipal Transportation Agency, and New York City maintains the New
York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, both of which specifically regu-
late taxis.13 Similarly, both cities maintain special laws that apply only to
hotels.14
Just as the disrupted industries of taxis and hotels have each had their
own regulatory structures to address their unique health and safety concerns
for decades, their sharing economy analogues also demand differentiated
regulatory responses. The kinds of solutions that will work for regulating
Uber, for instance, are unlikely to work for regulating Airbnb. Thus, in con-
templating a regulatory response to the sharing economy, the regulator needs
to first understand the market segment being disrupted and what new mar-
ness for drivers. From our founding in 2009 to our launches in hundreds of cities today, Uber’s
rapidly expanding global presence continues to bring people and their cities closer.”).
12 About Us, AIRBNB, supra note 2 (“Founded in August of 2008 and based in San Fran- R
cisco, California, Airbnb is a trusted community marketplace for people to list, discover, and
book unique accommodations around the world—online or from a mobile phone.”).
13 Taxi, SFMTA, http://www.sfmta.com/getting-around/taxi [http://perma.cc/EH3Z-
JCJK]; NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission, CITY OF N.Y., http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc
[http://perma.cc/8DSU-NTCJ].
14 See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 10.100-45 (2000) (discussing payment of Apart-
ment and Hotel License Fee); id. § 10E.1 (2013) (requiring informational reporting of net
increment or tourist hotel rooms and additional hotel employment in downtown districts); id.
§ 37.2(r)(1) (2015) (applying rent control to hotel stays of longer than thirty-two days); id.
§ 41 (2005) (imposing strict conditions on residential hotel unit conversion and demolition);
New York, NY, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/868/new-york—ny [https://perma
.cc/5PZN-ZVVK] (last updated Aug. 19, 2015).
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kets are being created by the sharing economy platform.15 With that informa-
tion, the regulator can then begin to contemplate how regulation should
respond to permit growth of sharing economy segments in a way that also
accounts for the needs of all constituencies and is within the laws as written
or newly conceived.
Further, the regulatory response should not be based around cutting
one-off deals with specific new market players; instead, the regulatory re-
sponse should be based upon regulating the entry of the sharing economy
platform into the existing market and regulating the new market. For in-
stance, a regulatory response to ride-sharing should not be based solely upon
a market-dominant company, such as Uber. Rather, cities should undertake a
broader analysis considering the changes caused by the sharing economy
technology to transportation services generally. Such changes may implicate
taxis and limousines, but may also involve policies and programs like HOV
lanes, congestion-pricing mechanisms, and so on. While working with a
market-dominant participant can be useful as a means of crafting regulation,
the rapid commodification of Internet technology means that such market
dominance can quickly disappear. Regulators need to take the time to under-
stand the complexity of the changes wrought by the technology to existing
and new markets in order to respond effectively.
B. Principle 2: The Sharing Economy Must Be Daylighted
Despite the rapid rise of the sharing economy, most sharing economy
companies often explicitly violate local government ordinances and state
statutes.16 The large number of violations is increasingly problematic; it sim-
ply should not be that a growing sector of the economy is illegal. When a
growing portion of the economy is illegal, it forces that economic activity
underground, where it is more difficult to understand the nature of the eco-
nomic activity.17 Further, when danger is associated with an illegal activity,
15 See infra Part III.
16 See Uber, Airbnb and Consequences of the Sharing Economy: Research Roundup,
JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE, http://journalistsresource.org/studies/economics/business/airbnb-lyft-
uber-bike-share-sharing-economy-research-roundup [http://perma.cc/5HMD-A2P9] (last up-
dated Oct. 19, 2015) (providing numerous sources of sharing economy companies’ illegality);
Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Releases Report Documenting Wide-
spread Illegality Across Airbnb’s NYC Listings; Site Dominated By Commercial Users (Oct.
16, 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-releases-report-documenting-
widespread-illegality-across-airbnbs-nyc [http://perma.cc/LU9H-YBJL] (noting that up to
72% of Airbnb listings are illegal: “Of the 35,354 private, short-term listings, data suggest that
25,532 of them violated either New York State’s Multiple Dwelling Law and/or New York
City’s Administrative Code (zoning laws). Hosts generated approximately $304 million in rev-
enue from these listings alone and, [sic] Airbnb itself earned almost $40 million from these
transactions.”).
17 See, e.g., Edgar L. Feige, Underground Activity and Institutional Change: Productive,
Protective, and Predatory Behavior in Transition Economies, in TRANSFORMING POST-COMMU-
NIST POLITICAL ECONOMIES 21, 23 (Joan M. Nelson, Charles Tilly & Lee Walker eds., 1997)
(“The effort to conceal underground activity systematically distorts conventional information
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the individual engaging in the activity might feel uncomfortable calling the
police.18 For example, when an Uber driver feels uncomfortable with a rider,
he may fail to call the police. Further, the more economic activity remains
illegal, the more difficult it will be for such companies to obtain investment
capital due to regulatory risk.19 For instance, the requirements to expose lia-
bilities in initial public offerings may limit some sharing economy compa-
nies from access to capitalization in public markets.20 In addition, economies
permitted to linger in the shadows of the law face the likelihood of taking on
more sinister malfeasance. As Justice Brandeis noted over a century ago,
“Sunlight is . . . the best of disinfectants.”21 For these reasons, the sharing
economy needs to be daylighted and brought into the legitimized transac-
tional world.
That said, recognizing the importance of daylighting this economic ac-
tivity does not necessarily mean brushing away existing regulation without
thoughtful consideration. In areas where the sharing economy has grown
substantially, regulation needs to be reimagined to achieve the same pur-
poses of the regulations first written for the traditional industry, as well as
the new markets created by the sharing economy.
systems and thereby complicates efforts to observe and monitor the consequences of policy
reforms.”); Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old Regu-
lations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289, 2302 (1994) (discussing efforts to “upgrade” informal economies
to legal status and prescribing policies for doing so).
18 See, e.g., Mark T. Berg, Lee Ann Slocum & Rolf Loeber, Illegal Behavior, Neighbor-
hood Context, and Police Reporting by Victims of Violence, 50 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 75,
93 (2013) (“[O]ffenders’ reluctance to call the police may stem from concerns about implicat-
ing themselves in their own unlawful actions or fears that reporting will result in retaliation or
damage to their reputation.” (citations omitted)).
19 See, e.g., Big Weed, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: PLANET MONEY (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.npr
.org/sections/money/2015/02/06/384347628/episode-602-big-weed [http://perma.cc/5QYT-
MHFF] (describing limited access to bank accounts, loans, and investors in the quasi-legal
marijuana industry).
20 The two major securities laws of the United States—the Securities Act of 1933, codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–bbbb (2012), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–kk (2012)—both require disclosure of illegal activity by corporations. See gen-
erally Eric D. Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirements of the
Federal Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 781 n.1 (1982) (describing applicable
provisions in detail). If an issuer is effectuating a registered offering, the registration statement
must contain a discussion of company-specific risk factors of which illegal activity would
qualify. See Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2015); Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2015). If
an issuer is effectuating an exemption from registration, some exemptions specifically require
the disclosure of risk factors. See, e.g., Rule 502(b)(2)(i)(A), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2015) (for
certain Reg. D exemptions). For other exemptions without explicit disclosure requirements,
issuers must nonetheless disclose risk factors, lest they be subject to securities fraud liability
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
21 Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10,
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/col
lection/papers/1910/1913_12_20_What_Publicity_Ca.pdf [http://perma.cc/X7CV-HFCU].
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C. Principle 3: Regulating the Sharing Economy Requires
(the Right Kind of) Information
Because many sharing economy companies operate in a manner con-
trary to law, their resistance to efforts to obtain information about their prac-
tices is not surprising. For instance, New York City and Airbnb have
famously fought over the release of data about hosts and travelers using
Airbnb’s web platform within New York City.22 Airbnb’s desire to retain cus-
tomer records is understandable, especially in light of potential crackdowns
on owners, tenants, and the STR Market generally. On the other hand, econ-
omists have long noted the importance of information to effective regulation.
Thomas Dietz has noted that governance of complex systems “depends on
good, trustworthy information.”23 Dietz further noted that “this information
must be congruent in scale” with the events and decisions governed and that
information needed is not only about what we do know, but also information
about uncertainty and how to “[characterize] the types and magnitudes of
this uncertainty.”24 The necessity of these information demands, in order to
create effective regulation, equally applies to the sharing economy.
The continued effort to obtain this information will certainly be conten-
tious. For example, in July 2015, the California Public Utilities Commission
(“California PUC”) fined Uber $7.3 million for failing to provide informa-
tion as required by the Commission’s new regulations for a “transportation
network company,” under which Uber would be allowed to operate subject
to the Commission’s regulations.25 While the fine is under appeal as of this
writing, the types of information that the California PUC sought, and which
Uber balked at providing, are illustrative of the daylighting issues at hand.
For instance, the California PUC sought information with regard to service
provided to those with disabilities that would detail the number and percent-
age of customers who requested accessible vehicles, and how often Uber
was able to comply with requests for accessible vehicles.26 In an effort to
gain information on real or perceived racial or income discrimination in the
provision of services, the California PUC similarly sought a verified report
detailing the number of rides requested and accepted, as well as the number
of rides that were requested but not accepted, by Uber drivers within each
22 Zach Miners, Airbnb to Reveal 124 New York Hosts to Attorney General, P.C. WORLD
(Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2598160/airbnb-to-reveal-124-new-york-
hosts-to-attorney-general.html [http://perma.cc/W8LW-JVNJ] (noting that the Attorney Gen-
eral sought “unredacted personal information” on 124 New York City Airbnb hosts).
23 Thomas Dietz et al., The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1908 (2003).
24 Id.
25 See Passenger Carriers, Ridesharing, and New Online-Enabled Transportation Services,
Rulemaking 12-12-011 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n July 15, 2015) (Presiding Officer’s Decision),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M153/K171/153171722.pdf [http://perma
.cc/W8CB-XFNJ].
26 Id. at 23–25, 84.
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zip code where Uber operates.27 The California PUC also requested data on
safety violations by drivers;28 the average and mean number of hours and
miles each Uber driver drove for Uber;29 and the nature of driver trainings
that Uber provided.30 In all cases, the administrative finding held that Uber
had failed to meet its informational burden under the regulation.31 The Cali-
fornia PUC’s informational requests are indicative of the types of public pol-
icy issues that regulators will likely seek to address in sharing economy
companies, especially in states with more aggressive regulatory regimes.
D. Principle 4: The Sharing Economy Is Here to Stay
(and That Is a Good Thing)
Several cities, faced with citizen concern, have taken to banning certain
sharing economy uses.32 This response has occurred in both large cities, such
as New Orleans with its ban of Airbnb,33 and mid-sized cities like Boise,
which tried to ban Uber.34 These bans may prove politically popular to a
constituency afraid of change, but they are not long-term strategies for ad-
dressing the sharing economy. Moreover, they are largely ineffective and
potentially embarrassing: Boise’s city attorney thought it had a deal with
Uber to end the ban several weeks after it became effective; however, that
interim agreement was rejected by the city council.35
The major problem facing such efforts to ban sharing economy uses is
simple: the market for sharing economy uses is insatiable, even in light of its
illegality. Another problem may arise for cities seeking to regulate sharing
economy uses in conservative states. The Boise example is telling. Rather
than continue negotiating with the Democratic-led Boise city government,
Uber instead decided to lobby the conservative Idaho Legislature, which de-
cided to pass a statute preempting all local government regulation of trans-
27 See id. at 25–29, 84.
28 Id. at 29–30, 84.
29 Id. at 85.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 In some cases, such as in San Francisco, even the passage of ordinances has not quelled
some citizens’ concerns, and referenda have been placed on ballots to tighten short-term rental
regulations. See, e.g., City of San Francisco Initiative to Restrict Short-Term Rentals, Proposi-
tion F (November 2015), BALLOTOPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_San_Francisco_Initia
tive_to_Restrict_Short-Term_Rentals,_Proposition_F_(November_2015) [http://perma.cc/
D8S8-YSAY].
33 See infra Part III.A.
34 Zach Kyle, Uber Defies Boise, Starts Charging, IDAHO STATESMAN (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://www.idahostatesman.com/news/business/government-and-business/article40834851
.html [http://perma.cc/HR2Q-36KC].
35 George Prentice, Uber Agreement With City of Boise Is Still Up on Blocks, BOISE
WKLY. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.boiseweekly.com/CityDesk/archives/2015/02/11/uber-
agreement-with-city-of-boise-is-still-up-on-blocks [http://perma.cc/KL93-YQYW].
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portation network companies (“TNCs”), thereby preventing Boise from
having any regulatory power over TNCs in its jurisdiction.36
Politics aside, the market demand remains the major driver that permits
these illegal uses to flourish. The high market demand is indicative of two
facts: consumer interest in sharing economy products, and the desire to mon-
etize under-utilized existing uses, such as the extra bedroom in a house.
Forbes estimated that “revenue flowing through the sharing economy di-
rectly into people’s wallets” would surpass $3.5 billion in 2013 with annual
growth exceeding 25% in the years since.37 Investors regard the sharing
economy as the new “megatrend” and are investing hundreds of million into
related start-ups.38 The STR Market exemplifies this growth. Airbnb claims
some 550,000 homes are shared by hosts in cities all over the world and 76%
of Airbnb properties are outside the main hotel districts, which leads Airbnb
guests to spend money in neighborhoods where they not otherwise stay.39
Although local governments are reasonably worried about runaway
market growth of an unregulated economy, they should also consider the
unprecedented opportunities that the sharing economy provides. Most local
governments are jurisdictionally bound; for some cities surrounded by adja-
cent cities, there is no way to grow but through annexation.40 As a result, the
growth of a local government’s economy is typically based on the nature of
land use decisions that provide jobs, taxes, or other resources to the commu-
nity. These growth-inducing decisions are balanced against those land use
decisions that result in municipal costs.41 Most municipal land use decisions
today maintain some component of the monetization of land use, in which a
36 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws 1075, 1078 (adopting into law Idaho Code section 49-3715,
which provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as provided in section
49-3708, Idaho Code, TNCs and TNC drivers are governed exclusively by this chapter. No
municipality or other local entity may impose a tax on, or require a license for, a TNC, a TNC
driver, or a vehicle used by a TNC driver where such tax or licenses relates to providing TNC
services, or subject a TNC to the municipality or other local entity’s rate, entry, operational or
other requirements.”); see also H.B. 262, 63d Leg. (Idaho 2015), http://www.legislature.idaho
.gov/legislation/2015/H0262.htm [http://perma.cc/7M7G-FSHQ].
37 Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Feb.
11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-
rise-of-the-share-economy/ [http://perma.cc/7PYA-GQ5L].
38 See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
39 David Hantman, Airbnb Economic Impact Around the World, AIRBNB (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/airbnb-economic-impact-around-the-world/ [http://perma.cc/
APX9-5P98].
40 In many states, the growth of cities is further bound by agreements governing growth
with counties. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56425 (West 2015) (governing cities’ extraterrito-
rial “spheres of influence” into adjoining county territory); CECILY TALBERT BARCLAY, CUR-
TIN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW 454–71 (29th ed. 2009) (discussing detailed
procedures for city annexation and sphere of influence boundary changes).
41 See DeVita v. County of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1036 (Cal. 1995) (“[T]he planning and
zoning amendment process has become in many communities one of ‘piecemeal adjustment’
by local planners and local legislators in response to development pressures. . . . This conclu-
sion comports with the well-known phenomenon commonly referred to as the ‘fiscalization of
land use,’ whereby planning decisions are frequently driven by the desire of local governments
to approve development that will compensate for their diminished tax base in the post-Proposi-
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city’s build-out of its limited land is based in part upon the relative economic
and social costs and benefits derived from particular uses.42
The sharing economy, however, offers a second bite at the apple for
those jurisdictions that have already built out their land.43 Indeed, cities rou-
tinely spend considerable effort and resources to redevelop areas deemed to
be under-performing in terms of their civic use, or more bluntly, their tax
performance.44 The whole impetus of “urban renewal” and “redevelop-
ment” districts, much less “tax increment financing,” is to assist areas of
cities in developing.45 Quite often, these districting and funding techniques
are used to help urban areas compete against low-cost “greenfield,” subur-
ban development patterns that offer easy, cheap access to land.46 Cities rou-
tion 13 era.” (quoting Linda C. Dalton, Limits of Regulation: Evidence from Local Plan Imple-
mentation in California, 55 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 151, 159 (1989))).
42 See Jonathan Schwartz, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and
the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 198 (1997);
Michelle Wilde Anderson, Sprawl’s Shepherd: The Rural County, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 365, 376
n.59 (2012); Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Local Public Services and
Finance: Its Relevance to Urban Fiscal and Zoning Behavior, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND
USE CONTROLS: THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 1, 6–11 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds.,
1975).
43 This issue is especially important in the context of school funding. See RICHARD BRIF-
FAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 486 (7th ed. 2008) (“[P]ublic elementary and secondary education is the most important
service provided by local governments. . . . [T]here are enormous differences in the amount of
taxable property per school-age child among different localities. These differences are the di-
rect result of the uneven geographical distribution of tax-generating properties, such as indus-
trial facilities, commercial centers, and wealth residences.”).
44 See Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW.
423, 423 (2010) (describing modern antecedents of urban renewal dating back to Haussmann-
era Paris).
45 Perhaps the most important tool in redevelopment is not the declaration of a redevelop-
ment, or “urban renewal” district, but the ability to access tax increment financing that is
linked to such districts in most states. See Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax
Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65,
65 (2010) (“Tax increment financing (TIF) is the most widely used local government program
for financing economic development in the United States . . . .”).
46 Although the original purpose of redevelopment and TIF was to assist urban areas in
interlocal competition with suburban areas, many suburban areas now compete aggressively
with TIF projects and redevelopment districts of their own. Greg LeRoy, TIF, Greenfields, and
Sprawl: How an Incentive Created to Alleviate Slums Has Come to Subsidize Upscale Malls
and New Urbanist Developments, 60 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 6 (2008) (“Even if a suburb’s
economic development strategy is not distorted by a need for sales tax revenue, TIF may
become a tool with which it can entice companies to relocate from elsewhere in the same
metro area (and thereby win jobs and long-term tax-base growth). When there is no regional
mechanism to promote cooperation and TIF’s targeting rules have been relaxed so that even
newly developing areas can create TIF districts.”). It is this abuse of TIF, in part, that has led
to some dramatic overhauls of redevelopment, including, most notably, the decision by Cali-
fornia Governor Jerry Brown to eliminate redevelopment altogether. See Redevelopment
Agency Dissolution, CAL. DEP’T FIN., http://www.dof.ca.gov/redevelopment/ [http://perma.cc/
K5CC-BDG8] (“As part of the 2011 Budget Act, and in order to protect funding for core
public services at the local level, the Legislature approved the dissolution of the state’s 400
plus RDAs. After a period of litigation, RDAs were officially dissolved as of February 1,
2012.”).
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tinely use these financing techniques to provide infrastructure for
redevelopment uses.
The sharing economy offers cities a whole new model for development
not limited by the availability of land. Most sharing economy uses require
very little additional infrastructure because they typically do not increase use
to the point where new infrastructure is necessary. As a result, the sharing
economy provides cities the potential to redevelop certain areas, for in-
stance, a wholly residential neighborhood into a mostly residential neighbor-
hood with a small, distributed transient occupancy use. Just as the sharing
economy industry has illustrated that it is creating value in places once non-
monetized, so too does that monetization opportunity provide cities a way to
reconceptualize the cities’ economies with a much lighter touch than the
traditional tools—annexation, redevelopment, infrastructure—have typically
required.47 As a result, the continuing rise of the sharing economy should be
a boon to cities, both in terms of economic development for its citizens over-
all and for the tax revenues—presuming they are ultimately collected on
sharing economy uses—that cities sorely need.48
Finally, the sharing economy can provide a variety of services to local
governments, especially by helping to complete the economic and consumer
offerings.49 Consider the STR Market. Many families with young children
prefer vacationing in homes that afford amenities suitable to caring for
young children: ready access to a playground, a backyard, a kitchen, a place
to change diapers, multiple rooms for sleeping children while adults stay up
at night. Providing this kind of travel amenity has been largely impossible
for the traditional hotel industry, which derives much of its profits from
corporate travel and thus builds its rooms largely to accommodate such trav-
elers. The STR Market opens up travel options precisely in the kinds of
communities built for families: residential neighborhoods. Similarly, other
sharing economy uses may provide consumer services in demand at a level
below traditional market-entrance prices.
47 City annexation has long been fought with bitterness. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (involving contested annexation of the city of Allegheny, Penn-
sylvania by Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). The battle these days is often primarily over taxes,
which are typically higher in incorporated areas. See JON TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850-1970 32–63 (1976). See gener-
ally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)
(describing a theoretical region in which citizen-voters choose their city within the region
based upon relative tax and service packages).
48 Cities’ fiscal problems often derive, in great part, from state laws that control the nature
and extent of city taxation, as well as restrict cities’ authority to borrow money. See Rubin
Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home Rule, 51 NW. U. L.
REV. 27 (1956). See generally M. DAVID GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT
FINANCING (2008).
49 Small- and mid-sized cities that might not otherwise be able to support a brick-and-
mortar retail offering may benefit the most from offerings of the sharing economy because low
overhead costs and decentralized distribution may permit a broader array of niche markets in
those areas.
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These examples illustrate just a few ways that the sharing economy has
brought tremendous economic opportunities to individuals, businesses, and
even local governments, in addition to the personal satisfaction created by
the STR Market for many travelers. For these reasons, among many others,
the sharing economy is unlikely to go away any time soon, and that is good
for everyone.
E. Principle 5: The Sharing Economy Disrupts and Reimagines
Established Markets
The sharing economy challenges established markets, sometimes re-
ferred to as the “incumbent” market participant.50 Here again, the STR Mar-
ket proves a useful example of the sea change the sharing economy is
causing within certain sectors of the economy. Take, for instance, the estab-
lished hotel industry. A recent industry magazine article noted that Marriott
(inclusive of Ritz-Carlton, Bulgari, and Fairfield Inn brands) had 675,000
rooms in seventy-four countries, with 2013 revenues of $12.7 billion and a
September 2014 market value of $20 billion (1.6 times prior year reve-
nues).51 Hilton (inclusive of the Waldorf-Astoria, Embassy Suites, and
Hampton Inn brands) had 679,000 rooms in ninety-one countries, 2013 reve-
nues of $9.7 billion, and a market value of $25 billion (about 2.5 times prior
year revenues).52 The InterContinental Hotels Group (inclusive of Crown
Plaza and Holiday Inn brands) in 2014 had 674,000 rooms in 100 countries,
2013 revenues of $1.9 billion, and a market value of $9 billion (about five
times prior year revenues).53
50 Incumbency, disruption, and related concepts derive from the theory of disruptive inno-
vation that has been popularized by business scholar Clayton Christensen, and which has been
largely adopted as the guiding template for sharing economy companies. In simplified terms,
Christensen’s theory posits that a disruptive innovation can upend the dominance of an incum-
bent market participant through offering a product that is: cheaper than the product of the
market incumbent, which typically chases higher-profit portions of the market; simple to use
while meeting the basic demands of the customer; more reliable than the market incumbent’s
basic product; and more convenient than the product of the market participant. See CLAYTON
M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 221–22 (1997). This Article uses the language
of disruptive innovation where relevant to exploring these business concepts; however, the
Article will not use this language throughout, as the theory is focused primarily on business
growth and does not seek to explore the externalities of business or best approaches to regulat-
ing disruptive innovations. In addition, this Article uses the term “established” in place of
“incumbency” in most instances to facilitate understanding within a broader, non-business
scholarship audience. See generally Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for
Local Governmental Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy”
(George Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 15-01, 2015) http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2549919 [http://perma.cc/7WAV-6467].
51 Michael A. Cusumano, How Traditional Firms Must Compete in the Sharing Economy,
58 COMM. ACM 32, 33 (2015).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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In contrast, as of February 2015, Airbnb had expanded to more than a
million listings in 34,000 cities and 190 countries.54 Airbnb claims over forty
million guests since its origin in 2008.55 Airbnb has also raised $826 million
in venture capital, with a most recent valuation of $10 billion, about forty
times 2013 estimated revenues of $250 million.56 In other words, the largest
hotel chains had fewer rooms, much slower growth rates, and much lower
valuations compared to their revenues than Airbnb.57
Further, Airbnb is eating into the established market. An empirical
study of the effect of the STR Market on the established hotel market esti-
mated that “each 10% increase in Airbnb supply results in a 0.35% decrease
in monthly hotel room revenue, translating to an impact exceeding 13% of
revenue in Austin, where Airbnb supply is highest.”58
The numbers are sufficient to illustrate the concern that established ho-
tel markets feel towards the STR Market, but it is worth some further inves-
tigation to understand some of the complexity of the issue. First, the
established market has spent considerable effort in building itself through
established means. For instance, a hotel must typically receive some sort of
discretionary permit to build and operate under most zoning codes; building
codes govern hotels through stringent regulations governing places of tran-
sient occupancy.59 For those hotels with public assembly facilities, such uses
are typically subject to the highest scrutiny of uses under building codes.60
Second, the established market, even if it bristles at regulation, typically
works within the rules or seeks to change the rules to an approach under
which they can prosper while sharing economy companies nimbly dodge
such regulation.61 They respond this way for several reasons. The established
market typically has a regulator that can cease the established market’s oper-
ation through traditional command-and-control regulation,62 such as a local
54 About Us, AIRBNB, supra note 2; see also Julie Weed, Airbnb Grows to a Million R
Rooms, and Hotel Rivals Are Quiet, for Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/05/12/business/airbnb-grows-to-a-million-rooms-and-hotel-rivals-are-quiet-for-
now.html [http://perma.cc/G9RW-HEDL].
55 About Us, AIRBNB, supra note 2. R
56 Cusumano, supra note 51, at 33. R
57 Id.
58 Zervas, Proserpio & Byers, supra note 3, at 1. R
59 See, e.g., S.F., CAL., FIRE CODE § 1103.5.3 (2015) (requiring automatic sprinkler sys-
tems for all hotels); id. § 1103.7.10 (2015) (requiring certification of fire alarm system in all
hotels); S.F., CAL., BUILDING CODE § 1301A (2015) (requiring hotels to participate in water
conservation through “installation of water conservation devices in commercial buildings upon
the occurrence of specific events and in any event no later than January 1, 2017”).
60 See S.F., CAL., BUILDING CODE ch. 3 (2015) (incorporating use and occupancy classifi-
cations from California Building Code).
61 Much of the best analysis of the relationship between regulated entities and administra-
tive agencies exists in scholarship on federal agencies. See generally 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.
& RICHARD MURPHY, Administrative Law and Practice § 4:40 (3d ed. 2015) (describing theo-
ries of decision-making in relation to influence of regulated parties and interests of the
agencies).
62 See 1 ENVTL. LAW INST., LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 3:25 (2015) (“The
pure command and control system is a four-step regulatory process. Three steps are exclu-
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government’s abatement processes under building codes, food codes, and so
on.63 The sharing economy, on the other hand, is elusive to such regulators,
which can make it difficult to use traditional command-and-control
processes to regulate the sharing economy uses.64
Third, the established market often collaborates within a much broader
business and governmental community in an effort to drive the local econ-
omy. One way to consider this is what might be considered the “convention
complex.”65 In those large cities that compete for major conventions—New
York, Chicago, New Orleans, San Diego, and San Francisco among them—
hotels are part of a systemic collaboration between government and industry
to bring conventions to town.66 The local government typically pays for the
infrastructure of the convention complex—the behemoth convention center
itself that often looms at the periphery of a financial district in many cities.67
The major hotels provide large blocks of transient occupancy space—hotel
rooms—that can house large numbers of people easily and efficiently for
coordinating groups. The relationship between the parties is often redoubled
through special tax arrangements, such as transient occupancy taxes on hotel
rooms, which are often earmarked specifically to pay for convention centers
and other accoutrements.68 Similarly, the major arts organizations in a region
often receive some funding from local governments derived from art fee
taxes on hotels. They also are located near the convention complex because
cultural amenities in the host community help drive convention business.69
sively the province of government; one step is exclusively the province of the regulated entity.
First, government writes regulations setting general standards for pollution control [or other
externality of a facility’s operation in non-environmental scenarios]. Second, government
writes permits setting particular requirements for individual facilities. Third, regulated private
entities operate their facilities in any way they choose so long as they meet the minimum
permit requirements. Fourth, if permit conditions are violated, government brings enforcement
actions against the private parties.”) (emphasis omitted).
63 See, e.g., S.F., CAL., BUILDING CODE § 102A (2015) (setting forth abatement proce-
dures for unsafe buildings, structures, or property).
64 See infra Part III and notes 158–160 (discussing New Orleans’ efforts to ban sharing R
economy uses).
65 See generally HEYWOOD T. SANDER, CONVENTION CENTER FOLLIES (2014).
66 See id. at 17, 79.
67 See, e.g., Development and Financing, MOSCONE CENTER, https://www.moscone.com/
press/dev.html [https://perma.cc/5PGE-2MBX] (“All phases of The Moscone Center’s devel-
opment were financed by a combination of the proceeds from the sale of revenue bonds and
accumulated hotel tax plus earnings on bond proceeds. The bonds were issued by the San
Francisco Redevelopment Agency from whom the City leases the facilities. Lease payments
drawn from the hotel tax fund are used to pay off the bonds. Project management for all
development phases has been provided by the City and County of San Francisco, Department
of Public Works.”).
68 See, e.g., Hotel Occupancy Taxes, CITY OF AUSTIN TEXAS, http://austintexas.gov/depart-
ment/hotel-occupancy-taxes [http://perma.cc/JFB4-6Z4G] (“The revenue derived from the
Hotel Occupancy Tax is used to promote tourism and the convention and hotel industry in
Austin.”).
69 See, e.g., About Us / History and Purpose, GRANTS FOR ARTS, S.F. HOTEL TAX FUND,
http://www.sfgfta.org/about/history_and_purpose.php [http://perma.cc/QA4K-HBR7] (“Since
its inception in 1961, Grants for the Arts has distributed over $320 million to hundreds of
nonprofit cultural organizations in San Francisco.”).
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The result is often a tremendous economic benefit to other uses—restau-
rants, taxis, retail shops—that are not explicitly a part of the convention
complex.
Thus, resentment toward sharing economy uses derives not only from
their stealing market share, but also from their disrupting a long-established
way in which cities and their business partners compete against other cities
in bidding for major events.70 (Of course, this could be easily rectified by the
sharing economy uses—such as Airbnb—becoming a part of the planning
effort. That would, however, likely require the legitimization of the sharing
economy use.
Fourth, the disruption of the incumbent industry is not always a one-to-
one match. Not all traditional hotel customers prefer a home-sharing ar-
rangement.71 Moreover, the sharing economy use is further distinguished
from the incumbent industry because the sharing economy may disrupt more
than one industry. For instance, on-line sharing economy uses like Airbnb
not only disrupt the hotel market, but, in many vacation destinations, they
have also disrupted the need for property managers and real estate brokers
who for generations have been one of the few ways for vacationers to find a
rental in a destination that is not within an established hotel use.72 For this
industry, the disruption may be even more complete: much of their business
is providing a connection between host and traveler, an information business
largely commodified and better performed through the online platforms.
This effect illustrates that disruption in the sharing economy is not always a
one-to-one tackling of a specific, established market; rather, the flexibility
and novelty of sharing economy uses also permits the sharing economy to
challenge multiple established markets at once.
70 Geoff Donaghy, Convention Centers Face Fierce Competition, EXHIBIT CITY NEWS
(May 1, 2014), http://www.exhibitcitynews.com/convention-centers-face-fierce-competition/
[http://perma.cc/7GPS-CA2M] (“For the destination, issues such as the quantity and quality
of available accommodation, safety and security, ease of access, overall cost structure and
attractiveness to delegates are most important. Two rapidly emerging factors for centers in
recent years have been technology and connectivity (to respond to growing delegate communi-
cations expectations) and the quality of the experience offered in both the center itself and the
immediate surrounding area as many delegates spend the bulk of their time in and around the
facility.”).
71 Zervas, Proserpio & Byers, supra note 3, at 20 (“Overall, we find that independent R
hotels, hotels that do not cater to business travelers, and lower-end hotels are all more heavily
affected by Airbnb than our respective reference categories, hotels which [sic] without these
characteristics.”).
72 See Jason Blevins, Resort Communities Weigh Regulation, Enforcement of Vacation
Rentals, DENVER POST (July 19, 2015), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_28501988/re-
sort-communities-weigh-regulation-enforcement-vacation-rentals [http://perma.cc/9EV4-
UWFE] (noting study of Colorado ski towns where up to 41% of housing units were listed on
short-term vacation rental sites).
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F. Principle 6: The Sharing Economy Establishes New Markets (That
Established Markets Want To Take Over)
The sharing economy also creates new markets. As the data in the pre-
vious section illustrated, the sheer volume of Airbnb rentals far surpasses
any loss in market share seen by hotels.73 Moreover, many vacation destina-
tion property managers use Airbnb and similar websites to advertise their
properties, perhaps reaching a wider audience through the sites, generating
more market demand, and increasing prices and profits for their rentals. This
novel use of Airbnb shows that a new market has been created for a new
type of travel beyond simply stealing or disrupting from the existing market.
In the fashionable parlance of the business school jargon, these new
markets of the sharing economy seem to be “blue oceans.”74 As the meta-
phor goes, established markets are typically “red oceans” where businesses
must compete for a finite resource, resulting in “blood in the water” because
one market participant must suffer for another market participant to pros-
per.75 “Blue oceans,” on the other hand, represent the creation of new mar-
kets. These new markets are established by market competitors where they
have a competitive advantage, allowing that competitor to enjoy the
pleasures of the blue ocean market without the deleterious constraints and
costs of red ocean markets.76 At first blush, it may seem that the sharing
economy is the archetypal platform for blue ocean markets, but considering
the enduring growth of the sharing economy, it may not be so for long.
In a perverse manner, the illegality of the sharing economy may well be
what preserves the new entrant’s sharing economy market rather than the
technology itself. The illegality of home-sharing keeps the brick-and-mortar
industries, such as hotels, from entering into the business because they have
physical assets that can be closed or seized by regulators seeking to enjoin
illegal action. However, it may soon be that major cities take action to legal-
ize sharing economy uses and even ownership or operation of such units by
corporations. If that time comes, it is very likely that the established market
participants, such as hotels, would seek to enter into the short-term rental
market. For instance, perhaps Marriott would spin-off a unit that specialized
in high-end, longer-term rentals of two or three weeks in nicer homes, pro-
viding a cleaning service, routinizing the collection and payment of taxes,
and providing forms at tax time. In other words, once the “sharing econ-
omy” emerges from the shadows of its illegality, the established market par-
ticipants will seek to grab the new market. The barrier to entry is not high:
the web platforms of many sharing economy sites are typically relatively
73 See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text. R
74 See generally W. CHAN KIM & RENEE MAUBORGNE, BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY: HOW TO
CREATE UNCONTESTED MARKET SPACE AND MAKE THE COMPETITION IRRELEVANT (2015).
75 Zoran Janevski, Blue Ocean Strategy in E-commerce Businesses, 1 ECON. DEV. 123,
124 (2012).
76 Id.
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mundane and already commodified technology. It would likely take months,
a year at most, for an established market participant to hire the appropriate
tech staff and build such a competitor platform. At least one scholar has
already laid forth a business plan for this kind of transition.77
Established market participants are already entering into the new mar-
ket created by the sharing economy. This phenomenon is perhaps most evi-
dent in the decision of New York City and Chicago officials to create an app
for their established, medallion-bearing taxi fleet.78 If they proceed to do so,
the viability of a company like Uber or Lyft could lessen overnight in those
jurisdictions, or else shift them toward other jurisdictions not typically
served well by urban taxi systems. Further, a third-party could almost cer-
tainly commodify the municipal app for taxis and roll it out in other cities
with taxi regulations. In the end, the new markets created by the sharing
economy will likely look a lot like the red oceans of the established market-
place once the sharing economy is no longer illegal.
G. Principle 7: The Sharing Economy Disrupts and Reimagines
Established Regulatory Structures
For nearly one hundred years, American cities have pursued a “ra-
tional” land use policy, primarily through zoning.79 The archetypal zoning
district of the early twentieth century was the “single-use district,”80 which
was typically used in subsequent decades to build out suburban single-fam-
ily residential communities that sought to zone out “lesser” uses, such as
multi-family housing units (thought to be associated with low income or
minority communities81) or nuisance-causing industrial uses.82 In subsequent
77 Cusumano, supra note 51, at 54 (arguing that established firms should compete in the R
sharing economy); Joan Voight, Marketers Need to Embrace Peer-to-Peer Activities: The
Sharing Economy, ADWEEK (May 27, 2013), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-brand-
ing/marketers-need-embrace-peer-peer-activities-149783 [http://perma.cc/36YA-NQ28].
78 Mike Isaac, Chicago and New York Officials Look to Build Uber-Like Apps for Taxis,
N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Dec. 11, 2014, 6:14 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/chi-
cago-and-new-york-officials-look-to-build-uber-like-apps-for-taxis/ [http://perma.cc/CFF2-
EW63].
79 See JOHN R. NOLON, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH LAND USE LAW:
STANDING GROUND 1–8 (2014) (discussing last 100 years of zoning regulations); Darwin G.
Stuart, Rational Urban Planning: Problems and Prospects, 5 URB. AFF. REV. 151, 151 (1969)
(“According to the rational planning process, the most appropriate and direct means for evalu-
ating alternative urban plans is through a comparison of their relative levels of goal achieve-
ment. That plan which contributes most to achieving the goals and values of a given urban area
is preferable.”).
80 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (validating single-use district
zoning).
81 12 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 1:5 (4th ed. 2004) (“Residential use, being considered to be the ‘highest use’ in that it was
the use to be protected from the intrusion of commerce or the pollution of industry, was the use
to which the as-yet-unspoiled areas of the community were restricted.”).
82 See generally Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495
(1994).
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decades, the strict single-use district has all but disappeared. Most zoning
districts permit some deviation from the “as of right” permitted use through
conditional use permits, or some other discretionary permitting scheme.83
This hybrid approach allows the local government to impose conditions of
approval that could ameliorate the conditional use’s effects on the district.84
Even with the flexibility such single-use zones have come to exhibit,
the system still prioritizes single uses, and the segregation of uses is still
especially prominent in the zoning of single-family residential districts. For
instance, churches and neighborhood-scale retail are still effectively zoned
out of most residential neighborhoods.85 Churches, once a key community
center for neighborhoods, now are typically located in commercial districts
next to strip malls, a rationalism of urban space derived from traffic patterns
rather than nihilism.86
This history, and in particular the intransigence of the single-family res-
idential zone, is an example of the kind of deep-seated regulation that the
sharing economy challenges. Many of the STR Market home-sharing units
are located in single-family residential zones that explicitly do not permit
hotels, much less bed and breakfasts, and often do not permit even de
minimis home business uses that may result in increased traffic or business-
related vans parked on the street.87
In this way, these districts do not discriminate specifically against the
STR Market, but against all business activity, with the goal of maintaining a
particular vision of residential life. Whether the structures of such zones are
socially beneficial is debatable. As the Cleburne court88 noted several de-
cades ago, the primacy of the residential single-family zone can burden indi-
83 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 81, at § 1:14 (“Perhaps the most significant R
changes in zoning concept and function are those which have greatly expanded the flexibility
of zoning as a land use control device and which have significantly enhanced the discretion of
local officials in the operation and administration of zoning code.”).
84 Id.
85 These problems are almost as old as zoning itself. See generally Paul Brindel, Zoning
Out Religious Institutions, 32 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 627 (1956).
86 See Jess Bravin, Church Turns to Higher Authority in Zoning Battle, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
16, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204450804576623053812974230
[http://perma.cc/3T2T-356B].
87 See, e.g., S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 202.1 (2015) (providing tables of permitted and
conditional uses in residential districts).
88 See Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (“In the courts
below the city also urged that the ordinance is aimed at avoiding concentration of population
and at lessening congestion of the streets. These concerns obviously fail to explain why apart-
ment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and the like, may freely locate in the area
without a permit. So, too, the expressed worry about fire hazards, the serenity of the neighbor-
hood, and the avoidance of danger to other residents fail rationally to justify singling out a
home such as 201 Featherston for the special use permit, yet imposing no such restrictions on
the many other uses freely permitted in the neighborhood. The short of it is that requiring the
permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded,
including those who would occupy the Featherston facility and who would live under the
closely supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provided for by state and federal
law.”).
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viduals—such as those with developmental disabilities or the elderly who
need to live communally—by forcing them out of residential areas and into
more institutional settings.89 The STR Market once again invites a long over-
due reconsideration of the viability—and desirability—of the single-family
residential zoning district.
Although the STR Market is most threatening to the viability of the
single-use residential zone, it is worth noting that the STR Market may also
challenge other zoning districts’ viability, as well. For instance, the STR
Market may well challenge the hotel and tourist districts, now thought to be
primarily places of transient occupancy. However, the STR Market could
help to reimagine traditional hotels as the loci of longer stays; this change
would not be without precedent and, in fact, could resemble how hotels op-
erated a century ago.90 The STR Market may, in fact, usher in a new era in
which extended stays become a part of the hotel districts. This would likely
require further amendment of existing laws, such as rent control provisions
that currently apply to long-term stays at hotels, but it is indicative of kinds
of changes to existing regulatory structures that the STR Market could chal-
lenge in the future.
H. Principle 8: The Sharing Economy Requires a Response beyond
Traditional Regulation
The STR Market illustrates how the sharing economy, by reimagining
the nature of commercial transactions, requires a regulatory response that
transcends established codes that were written to regulate established indus-
tries. Established markets—such as hotels—exist primarily as brick-and-
mortar commercial institutions working within the confines of business reg-
ulation. This principle is true both in the physical environment—such as
zoning and building codes—and in the administrative environment—such as
business licensing and taxation. On the other hand, most STR Market uses
are located in non-commercial spaces that are quite often the most intimate
of private spaces: homes and apartments located in neighborhoods.91 Further,
many hosts and travelers engaged in the STR Market often have no experi-
ence with the regulatory structures businesses face in either the physical or
89 See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAND USE LAW AND DISABILITY 239 (2014); Michael Kling,
Zoned Out: Assisted-Living Facilities and Zoning, 10 ELDER L.J. 187, 201 (2002).
90 PAUL GROTH, LIVING DOWNTOWN: THE HISTORY OF RESIDENTIAL HOTELS IN THE
UNITED STATES 19–20 (1994) (“A 1930 survey of the more expensive American hotels
showed that about a third of guests were mainly transient and about a sixth were mainly
permanent. Managers of the remainder called their businesses ‘mixed transient and permanent.’
The degree to which hotels of that era catered to permanent residents varied by the type of
hotel: ‘permanent residents lived in an average of 20 percent of the rooms in the most expen-
sive third of American hotels and at least 7.5 percent of the rooms in the remaining cheaper
hotels,’ a pattern that was likely seasonally the case in most American cities, if not year
round.”).
91 See infra Part III and notes 150–154. R
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administrative environments.92 Moreover, most business regulation did not
anticipate the rise of the STR Market and the sharing economy, and thus
typically does not have de minimis exceptions or easy compliance structures
for small uses. These business regulations also do not contemplate regula-
tory structures for considering how small uses, in aggregate, might produce
sizable externalities. It can seem desirable to simply find a way to expand
the existing regulations and make them amenable to smaller uses. However,
the unique intimacy and informality of the sharing economy make traditional
regulation unlikely to succeed.
In the STR Market, traditional command-and-control regulation has
three real options: a ban, a regulatory structure that creates a de minimis
exception within existing regulations that permits reduced compliance stan-
dards, or seemingly over-invasive enforcement.93 Bans and de minimis ex-
ceptions are unlikely to produce compliance, however, because the intimacy
and informality of the STR Market mean that most participating in the mar-
ket would likely take the chance of getting caught.94 Attempts to crack down
on a particular site would likely simply lead to other sites emerging to per-
form the same service, just as closing down Napster did not eliminate illegal
music-sharing in the Nineties and thereafter.95 Finally, an effort to force
compliance would seemingly require intimate enforcement: imagine a spe-
cial police force unit dragging out STR Market renters on vacation, or liens
placed on homes owned by those participating in the STR Market. Such
remedies do not seem politically plausible for any but the most active STR
Market participants.
Whatever response a city takes, it will likely require some regulatory
structure, especially to address the few bad actors that will inevitably partici-
pate in the sharing economy, but a command-and-control regulatory re-
sponse alone is unlikely to have success in controlling the externalities that
arise from a sharing economy sector like the STR Market. Instead, the city
response will likely require alternative approaches that rely on markets, in-
formation, and perhaps even regulatory structures that model the sharing
economy more directly.
92 See, e.g., Inspections, Permitting and Licensing: Hotels, CITY OF CHI., http://www
.cityofchicago.org/city/en/progs/inspectionspermitting/hotels.html [http://perma.cc/Y7E5-
8LNS] (listing numerous permits and zoning requirements necessary to operating a hotel).
93 See infra Part III.
94 See infra Part III and notes 158–160. R
95 See Stephen Witt, Goodbye to Piracy, SLATE (June 24, 2015), http://www.slate.com/
articles/arts/music_box/2015/06/illegal_music_sharing_is_ending_how_the_internet_finally_
grew_up_and_learned.html [http://perma.cc/KBH7-LJPK] (detailing broad extent of post-
Napster music piracy and how its end arose from the ease and low-cost of music-streaming
services rather than regulation).
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I. Principle 9: The Harm and the Remedy Are Uniquely Challenging To
Determine in the Sharing Economy
In many cases of industrial externalities, the harm is easy to identify: an
oil tanker runs aground and destroys an ecosystem killing fish and birds;
sulphur dioxide creates acid rain, which kills trees; particulate matter emis-
sions from diesel engines lead to increased cancer in the surrounding com-
munity. A remedy for such externalities is often also easy to propose:
double-hulled tankers;96 a sulphur-dioxide trading system;97 or a pollution
trap that limits emissions.98 In such cases, the difficulty often arises in trying
to monetize the harm, or finding a remedy where the benefits justify the
costs.
In the sharing economy, however, the harm is often uniquely challeng-
ing to determine. For instance, in the STR Market, who is harmed by a resi-
dent renting his or her home for the weekend to a stranger? Is the neighbor
harmed by having a stranger next door even if, as in most cases, the stranger
behaves and causes no actionable nuisance behavior? Perhaps the resident of
the neighborhood is harmed because the resident’s child is scared by sharing
a public playground with the stranger’s child. Perhaps the character of the
neighborhood changes as more residents participate in the STR Market. Per-
haps the cumulative effects of multiple STR Market rentals cause market
rents to rise, as landlords start to incorporate STR Market rentals into the
market rent of residential apartments. Perhaps it could be argued that the
community is harmed because its collective regulations, those intended to
protect the public health and safety, face a challenge to their integrity
through flagrant violation. All of these are plausible harms of the STR Mar-
96 See A Final Farewell to Oil Tankers with Single Hulls, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ASS’N OFFICE OF RESPONSE & RESTORATION (Dec. 11, 2014), http://response.restoration.noaa
.gov/about/media/final-farewell-oil-tankers-single-hulls.html [http://perma.cc/F3QZ-ULUU]
(“January 1, 2015 marks a major milestone in preventing oil spills. That date is the deadline
which the landmark Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90) specifies for phasing out single-hull
tankers in U.S. waters. That act, passed after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, required that all new tankers and tank-barges be built with double hulls.”).
97 See Acid Rain Program, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/airmar
kets/acid-rain-program [http://perma.cc/MG47-GXHR] (“The ARP was the first national cap
and trade program in the country, and it introduced a system of allowance trading that uses
market-based incentives to reduce pollution. Reducing emissions using a market-based system
provides regulated sources with the flexibility to select the most cost-effective approach to
reduce emissions, and has proven to be a highly effective way to achieve emission reductions,
meet environmental goals, and improve human health.”).
98 See Vehicle Emissions Research, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY: AIR RESOURCES
BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/veh-emissions/veh-emissions.htm [http://perma.cc/
M2PD-MUEV] (describing numerous programs intended to reduce particulate matter from
diesel engines); Ghassan B. Hamra et al., Outdoor Particulate Matter Exposure and Lung
Cancer: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 122 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 906, 906 (2014),
http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/122/9/ehp.1408092.pdf [http://perma.cc/LA4W-
8E8A] (“The results of these analyses, and the decision of the IARC Working Group to clas-
sify PM and outdoor air pollution as carcinogenic (Group 1), further justify efforts to reduce
exposures to air pollutants that can arise from many sources.”).
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ket, but all of them ring—at least at this stage in the evolution of the STR
Market—as alarmist, the causation highly attenuated, and what harms are
describable are primarily based upon psychological harm.99
Just as the harm in the sharing economy can be difficult to locate, so,
too, is the remedy for the harm difficult to imagine. As noted above, typical
regulatory structures do not seem to graft well onto sharing economy uses,
such as the STR Market. That does not mean command-and-control regula-
tion is not necessary; it does mean, however, that efforts to remedy whatever
harms the sharing economy may place upon others will almost certainly
challenge existing regulatory norms.
As local governments begin to develop a regulatory response to the
sharing economy, they should consider the nature of the remedy they seek.
For instance, in contracts, in some instances the appropriate remedy is to put
the non-breaching party back into its position prior to the breach.100 In this
case, it is hard to imagine what that would mean for the STR Market. Argua-
bly it might mean something like making sure the city receives the same
amount of transient occupancy tax it was receiving prior to the STR market’s
entrance into the city. However, because the STR Market not only competes
in the existing market but also creates new markets for transient occupancy,
simply placing the city back in the same position as it was in prior to the
STR Market’s arrival may mean the city was receiving less money on each
night’s stay. On the other hand, if the STR Market were legalized and the
city received transient occupancy tax on both the existing market and the
new market shares, it would actually be better off than the position it was in
prior to the arrival of the STR Market. For these reasons, any remedy that
99 Of course, there have been some terrible occurrences associated with short-term rentals,
especially as relating to individuals. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Airbnb Horror Story Points to Need
for Precautions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/your-
money/airbnb-horror-story-points-to-need-for-precautions.html [http://perma.cc/AG35-TPG2]
(describing alleged rape of Airbnb guest in shared rental and Airbnb’s unwillingness to give
exact location of unit during attack). Still, in light of the broad number of rentals occurring on
any given day—some 375,000 rentals per day on Airbnb—the stories of bad actors are few
and far between and concerns about loss of neighborhood character appear to be limited to a
few jurisdictions. Cf. Sam Sanders, Santa Monica Cracks Down On Airbnb, Bans ‘Vacation
Rentals’ Under A Month, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 13, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2015/05/13/406587575/santa-monica-cracks-down-on-airbnb-bans-vacation-rent-
als-under-a-month [http://perma.cc/34GC-RG5X] (quoting mayor as stating: “When a land-
lord or other property owner takes a unit off the housing market and uses it for vacation rental,
there is no permanent resident on the site, we’ve lost that part of the fabric of our commu-
nity. . . . And the people who are coming to stay are not directly supervised, so they, being on
vacation may, in total innocence, may be coming and going at two or three in the morning.
They may be not aware of the noise they’re making for the neighbors. The neighbors aren’t sure
who the people are. You end up with somebody you don’t know who has the keys to the
building, to the parking garage. You don’t who they’re going to bring in with them. And you
don’t have that connection.”).
100 Richard A. Lord, 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:1 (4th ed. 2015) (“This goal of
compensating the promisee following a breach of contract by the promisor is, to the extent
possible through an award of money damages, to place the plaintiff-promisee in as good a
position as he or she would have occupied had the defendant-promisor not breached the
contract.”).
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seeks to return the city to a perceived equilibrium prior to the arrival of the
disruptive sharing economy use is likely to obscure the role of the sharing
economy in city finances and other aspects of city life.
Instead, a more promising approach would be to consider a model of
harm and remedy modeled upon the relationship between sharing economy
companies and those that use them. This model would be one of shared risk
and shared reward. A company like Airbnb needs people to trust that they
will match the homeowners with reliable individuals and will ensure that the
homeowner gets paid. On the flipside, Airbnb needs to trust that the pictures
posted by the homeowner are accurate; otherwise, they will need to expend
tremendous energy and money to regulate their postings, a feat that might
make the business untenable or at least significantly impede its rapid growth.
This mutual trust between the private parties and the sharing economy plat-
form might have seemed almost unimaginable a decade ago, but cultural
customs have so radically shifted that now house-sharing is not unusual in
the least.
The best form of local government regulation of the sharing economy
also may be one that uses as its measure a shared risk and shared reward. Of
course, this type of regulation is antithetical to traditional police power regu-
lation,101 which is not directly based on risk tolerance, but instead upon es-
tablishing limits of health and safety that are typically bright lines of
compliance. If, instead, the city were to adopt a more flexible approach to
regulation, one that responded to risk tolerance for the sharing of private,
and even private-seeming public spaces like neighborhoods, the city and its
citizens could also become partners in sharing the rewards of this risk
tolerance.
Finally, it is also important to note that the difficulty of determining
harm and remedy in the sharing economy is a reason why insurance is espe-
cially important to the evolution of these new sharing sectors.102 Certainly
harms will arise from time to time—a traveler will break a lamp or, worse,
steal expensive jewelry from a host. While mandating insurance on STR
Market rentals does not eliminate that harm or make it easier to predict, it
does make it easier to remedy the harm. For these reasons, it is worth noting
that many of the STR Market web platforms already provide a “home-
owner’s guarantee”—though Airbnb is clear that they are not providing in-
surance, per se—on their rentals, which help to alleviate this concern.103
101 See generally Stephen R. Miller, Community Rights and the Municipal Police Power,
55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 675, 679–701 (2015) (providing concise history of police regulatory
power’s evolution).
102 See Jason Tanz, What Makes or Breaks Startups in the Sharing Economy? Insurance
Rates, WIRED (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/sharing-economy-insurance/
[http://perma.cc/5QQC-NULV] (“Insurance represents both the lifeblood and the biggest
threat to the sharing economy.”).
103 Airbnb’s $1,000,000 Host Guarantee, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/guarantee
[https://perma.cc/4CDP-4ZSD].
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL107.txt unknown Seq: 26 20-JAN-16 10:22
172 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 53
J. Principle 10: The Sharing Economy Implicates Diverse Parties, Each
of Whom Should Be Considered in Establishing
a Regulatory Response
Most popular commentary on the sharing economy focuses on two par-
ties: the government as regulator and the disruptive sharing economy com-
pany. Depending on a commentator’s view, typically one party or the other is
a scoundrel. Either the government entity is crippling creativity and innova-
tion with regulations, or the sharing economy use is ruining neighborhoods
and driving up rents. This argument misses the larger picture.  If the govern-
ment and the disrupting sharing economy company were the only parties
involved, the issue would have been solved a long time ago. Indeed, the only
way that the sharing economy will ever find resolution as a viable, legal
business venture will be to engage the whole panoply of parties with an
interest in the sharing economy and how it changes communities. This sec-
tion provides an overview of these parties and their relative concerns. The
goal here is to be inclusive of potential interests primarily to illustrate that
any conception of how the sharing economy is affecting society that focuses
solely on regulators and the disruptive market participant will fail to resolve
the issue. An approach that acknowledges the legitimate concerns of all of
the affected parties is far more likely to yield a result that seems fair to all
and has lasting, broad-based community benefits.
1. State and Local Governments
State and local governments are often painted as adversaries to the shar-
ing economy, most often cast by those in the sharing economy camp as
“regulators” seeking to destroy a burgeoning business.104 As noted previ-
ously, the reality is that most state and local governments would naturally
seek to encourage the sharing economy because it permits jurisdictionally-
bound entities to grow their economies while adding little in the way of
infrastructure costs or annexation battles.105 The adversarial relationship be-
tween state and local governments and the sharing economy arises, however,
because of several points of conflict where the sharing economy violates
provisions that are generally applicable to all residents and corporations in
the city. If the state and local governments were to permit the sharing econ-
omy uses to enjoy a holiday from such generally applicable regulations, it
would become hard to justify why other uses might not parse their way out
104 See, e.g., Stephen J.K. Walters, Millennials Can Rescue Cities from Their Leftist Rul-
ers, NAT’L REV. (Aug 3, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421897/mil-
lennials-can-rescue-cities-their-leftist-rulers-stephen-j-k-walters [http://perma.cc/M5N8-
3DAL] (“The nature of firms like Uber and others in the Sharing Economy is disruptive,
entrepreneurial, competitive, and non-bureaucratic. It is antithetical to the Soviet-style eco-
nomic thinking that prevails on the left.”).
105 See supra Part II and notes 40–49. R
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of compliance, as well. Several examples from the STR Market serve to
prove the general rule.
First, one of the most obvious concerns for state and local governments
is loss of tax revenue. Hotels generate a special type of tax revenue for
cities, often referred to as a transient occupancy tax, which can be a major
source of revenue for many jurisdictions.106 This is especially true in states
that have adopted some version of property tax caps on residential uses, such
as California’s Proposition 13, which have resulted in the “fiscalization of
land use.”107 For many cities, hotels have become a necessary land use be-
cause they permit the city to obtain taxes from non-residents and at a rate
that far exceeds typical sales taxes.108 Further, these transient occupancy
taxes are often specifically earmarked for specific traveler-related economic
development, such as assistance with convention center maintenance and ex-
pansion, and the broader “convention complex” of uses that help cities lure
travelers.109 To the extent that the STR Market is replacing the existing hotel
stays, the STR Market is reducing the city’s access to this valuable source of
taxation, which thus also challenges the ability of cities to continue provid-
ing the convention-related infrastructure on which tourist-based cities de-
pend. For instance, San Francisco expects to receive $11 million a year from
Airbnb collecting the city’s 14% transient occupancy tax, which is collected
in addition to other state taxes.110 It is not surprising, then, that efforts of
cities and states where tourism is a major business have sought to resolve
this taxation issue first.
One approach is to have the unit owner calculate and pay the tax. A
second approach is to require the sharing economy website, such as Airbnb
or VRBO,111 to calculate and to pay the tax for all of the units rented within
the jurisdiction and then remit that payment to the city in one lump sum.112
An argument against either approach is that the transient occupancy tax
structures are aimed at traditional hotels while the de minimis use by a unit
106 See supra Part II.E and note 68. R
107 See generally Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2001)
(discussing proliferation of such taxes in California after Proposition 13 and its companion
legislation Proposition 218).
108 See, e.g., Cory Biggs, Who Runs San Diego: The Use and Abuse of the Transient Occu-
pancy Tax, SAN DIEGO FREE PRESS (Sept. 3, 2014), http://sandiegofreepress.org/2014/09/who-
runs-san-diego-the-use-and-abuse-of-the-transient-occupancy-tax/ [http://perma.cc/GZ3K-
TPQN].
109 See supra Part II.E and notes 65–69. R
110 Carolyn Said, S.F. Could Get $11 Million a Year When Airbnb Collects Hotel Tax,
S.F.GATE (Sept. 18, 2014, 7:42 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/S-F-could-get-
11-million-a-year-when-Airbnb-5762838.php [http://perma.cc/F8N9-WTNU].
111 VRBO.com is another popular site, similar to Airbnb.com, which provides an online
platform for on-demand short-term rentals. VRBO.com is owned by HomeAway, which owns
numerous brands of on-demand short-term rental platforms targeted at niche markets. See
About Us, HOMEAWAY, http://www.homeaway.com/info/about-us [http://perma.cc/LF6L-
HEKS] (claiming HomeAway sites offer “over one million live vacation rental listings in 190
countries”).
112 See infra Part III.H and note 204–208. R
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owner “sharing” an apartment for a night is hardly engaged in the tourism
trade.113 However, that argument likely fails when the broader purpose of
transient occupancy taxes—collecting revenue on tourism that shifts costs of
city services to non-residents—is considered. Even if an STR unit were held
to not be within the scope of a transient occupancy tax, it is almost certain
that affected local governments would soon revise such laws to bring STR
Market uses within their scope.
The issues for state and local government raised by the sharing econ-
omy go far beyond taxes, even if taxes remain the most obvious and pressing
concern. Among the other concerns for local governments are maintaining
the integrity of their zoning and building codes, as well as their licensing
procedures, all of which apply generally to those properties in a particular
neighborhood or engaging in a particular business.114 If cities were to decide
not to enforce these regulations against sharing economy uses that flagrantly
skirt them—New York estimates that 72 percent of Airbnb rentals are ille-
gal115—then the general applicability of those laws becomes suspect. Cities
would face the problems associated with weak enforcement of the rule of
law, most notably, selective enforcement, real or perceived.
There are also deeper considerations cities have that are seldom dis-
cussed. For instance, if an STR unit is routinely shared, should the unit be
assessed, for tax collection purposes, to reflect that new quasi-commercial
use? This question becomes particularly problematic where it is clear that a
home is no longer being used primarily as a dwelling unit, but instead prima-
rily as a short-term rental use.
Cities also have concerns about the viability and integrity of their af-
fordable housing policies. Many affordable housing units, or rent-controlled
units, provide renters the opportunity to live in below-market rent apart-
ments in areas of the city they could not otherwise afford. If those units are
then used either substantively, or even in part, as a part of the STR Market,
that could jeopardize the integrity of a number of affordable housing
policies.116
A related housing concern is anti-eviction statutes and ordinances,
which typically pertain to those who rent for more than a certain number of
days, normally around 30 days.117 These laws are intended to protect tenants;
however, as has been publicized through an infamous California example,
travelers in the STR Market may seek to obtain access to a dwelling unit
through the STR Market, pay for the apartment for longer than the time
necessary for the tenant policy to apply, and then refuse to pay any more and
113 See infra Part III.S and note 241. R
114 See infra Part III.D.
115 See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY (2014).
116 See Carolyn Said, S.F. Cracks Down on Airbnb Rentals, S.F.GATE (Apr. 7, 2014,
2:26 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-cracks-down-on-Airbnb-rentals-
5381237.php [http://perma.cc/ZH6A-T943].
117 See infra Part III.G and note 203. R
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“squat” the property until the unit owner goes through expensive and time-
consuming tenant eviction proceedings.118 Clearly, cities also have an inter-
est in protecting their citizens from abuse of the STR Market in this way.
This brief analysis indicates that while taxes remain the most important
issue for many states and cities with regard to the sharing economy, these
governments justifiably have a significant number of regulatory issues that
must be thought through to effectively integrate the STR Market, much less
sharing economy uses generally, into the legal markets with which these
uses compete.
2. Disrupted, Established Market Participant
Almost every “sharing economy” business has a non-sharing economy
equivalent. While the sharing economy revolutionized access to commerce
for underutilized goods, the sharing economy seldom invents needs or mar-
kets out of whole cloth. Most sharing economy businesses replicate services
already offered, in some fashion, by a non-sharing economy business.119
On the other hand, the sharing economy web platforms often have sub-
stantial differences from their non-sharing economy counterparts. A com-
mon distinction at this time is that the sharing economy permits individuals,
through intermediary sites like Airbnb, to compete against major corpora-
tions in well-established hotel markets that might otherwise shut out small
market participants. The theory of incumbency includes the notion that the
established market participant may use governmental regulatory structures—
codes, licenses, and so on—as a way to keep out competition or to otherwise
limit it to a small group of companies that work together to maintain a high
barrier to entry.120 For instance, the hotel trade is highly regulated, which at
first would appear to be for health and safety purposes of a transient popula-
tion that cannot otherwise gain access to the political process to ensure that
they have a safe place to sleep for the night. Others, however, would note
that the very same set of regulations makes it difficult for individuals, or
even small companies, to start hotels: the costs of regulatory compliance for
a small company might be crushing or prohibitive, whereas a large company
118 Julie Bort, Airbnb Host: A Guest Is Squatting In My Condo and I Can’t Get Him to
Leave, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 21, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-host-cant-
get-squatter-to-leave-2014-7#ixzz3S4Kbui4t [http://perma.cc/82ZL-4PW9].
119 See supra Part II.E.
120 Even those that favor government regulation have worried over the rise of licensure as
a means of protecting established business interests. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF
ECON. POLICY, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS & DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING:
A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (July 2015) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3H9L-TZNA] (“More than one-quarter of U.S. workers now require a li-
cense to do their jobs, with most of these workers licensed by the States. The share of workers
licensed at the State level has risen five-fold since the 1950s.”).
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can easily absorb the “cost of doing business.”121 To those that see a plot in
such regulatory structures and are cynical as to the health and safety aims,
there is delight in the sharing economies’ flagrant violation of these regula-
tory structures.
There is, however, a problem with the narrative. The term incumbency
is as misleading as the term “the sharing economy” is in understanding the
revolution underway. As several scholars and businesses are starting to real-
ize, the “incumbent” market is just as interested in participating in the
“sharing economy” as the “sharing economy” is in taking away market
share from the incumbent market.122 Therefore, while it might be easy to
view the situation as a David and Goliath tale of fighting for a defined mar-
ket share, the truth is likely more complicated. The inevitability of the estab-
lished market’s entrance into the sharing economy will be discussed more
later; however, there is perhaps no better way to illustrate an incumbent’s
entrance into the sharing economy than to note that New York City and
Chicago have already begun work on apps that would allow their medallion-
bearing taxis to e-hail taxis just like Uber or Lyft users do;123 similarly, theo-
rists of hotel management are already contemplating market strategies for
how hotels can enter the neighborhood-based STR Market as it becomes
legalized.124
It is also worth noting that, in some cases, a major concern for estab-
lished industries is how the sharing economy maintains a competitive advan-
tage through its illegality. For instance, a high-end hotel appealing to a
couple visiting a city for a weekend might compete with an STR Market in a
fashionable neighborhood. Assuming the hotel and the STR Market units are
equally attractive and equally priced, the STR Market still maintains a mar-
ket advantage in most locations where transient occupancy taxes are not col-
lected on the STR unit. In cities like San Francisco or New York where
transient occupancy taxes (often up to 15%), when coupled with other state
and local taxes (often up to 10%), can approach a total taxation rate of
25%,125 that means the equally attractive, equally priced STR unit maintains
121 This phenomenon, in which up-front fees of development become part of the price of
real estate product, have been especially well researched and heavily discussed in the residen-
tial development area. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land
Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 212 (2006) (“The
explanation of why developers are able to pass on the impact fee cost plus an additional incre-
ment appears to rest upon consumer willingness to pay for established, in-place services that
will benefit them immediately in a predictable way.”). The same is applicable to other devel-
opment fees.
122 See supra Part II.F and note 77. R
123 See Isaac, supra note 78. R
124 Cusumano, supra note 51, at 34 (“There is also nothing to stop traditional companies R
from becoming more like their sharing-economy counterparts.”).
125 See Said, supra note 110 (discussing rates of transient occupancy tax collected by R
Airbnb for several local governments); Hotel Room Tax, CITY & CNTY. S.F., CAL. CONTROL-
LER’S OFF., http://www.sfcontroller.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=242
[http://perma.cc/RJ2U-DTAA] (noting receipts of transient occupancy tax in recent years in
excess of $240 million).
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a 25% cost advantage simply because of failure to collect the tax. A recent
study of the price of Airbnb rentals compared to hotels found that an Airbnb
rental for an entire apartment cost, on average, 21% less than a hotel room;
with the 25% taxes not paid on an STR unit, the differential could approach
50%.126 Thus, the established market has an interest in ensuring that the re-
sults of such illegal behavior do not alter the market in a way that disfavors
the established market’s product.
It is sufficient here to make these several, simple observations. The
sharing economy competes with established markets. The sharing economy
is unlikely to wholly eliminate the established market; for instance, the elite
business traveler hotel is unlikely to see pressure from the STR Market any
time soon, even if the budget hotels feel a greater share of that market com-
petition. These principles are illustrated by a recent study, noted earlier,
which found that a 1% increase in Airbnb listings in Texas results in a 0.05%
decrease in quarterly hotel revenues, and that the impacts are distributed
unevenly across the industry, with lower-end hotels and hotels not catering
to business travelers being the most affected.127 Finally, the established mar-
ket participant is just as interested in participating in the sharing economy
market space as the sharing economy is in participating in the market space
of the established market.
3. The Economic Development Machine
Another reason that the sharing economy has encountered resistance is
that there is, in many cities, a coalescence of business and civic interests that
seek to promote a coherent image of the city.128 This is especially true in the
tourism sector and the overlapping economic development sectors of civic
life, both of which share the job of selling an image of the city that requires a
certain discipline among an array of retailers, merchants, and city officials.
As noted previously, this alignment is particularly prevalent in those cities
that compete for conventions that demand a unique infrastructure able to
routinely accommodate and please large numbers of people at a time.129
Thus, it is notable that the founding myth of Airbnb involves a convention.
Purportedly, the founders were two young architects living in San Francisco
when a major convention came to town; they needed help paying the rent
and decided to try hosting people for the convention.130
126 Airbnb vs Hotels: A Price Comparison, PRICEONOMICS.COM (June 27, 2013), http://
priceonomics.com/hotels/ [http://perma.cc/F56H-EK57].
127 See Zervas, Proserpio & Byers, supra note 3, at 1. R
128 See generally CHESTER HARTMAN, CITY FOR SALE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF SAN
FRANCISCO (2002) (describing how the business council effectively determined the future of
major infrastructure in the Bay Area after World War II).
129 See supra Part II.E and notes 65–70. R
130 See Jessica Salter, Airbnb: The story behind the $1.3bn room-letting website, TELE-
GRAPH (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9525267/Airbnb-The-
story-behind-the-1.3bn-room-letting-website.html [http://perma.cc/9PEK-BASF] (“Airbnb
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL107.txt unknown Seq: 32 20-JAN-16 10:22
178 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 53
These coalitions often also include labor unions, which in the more lib-
eral cities have workers in hotels and other parts of the convention com-
plex.131 Those unions take a strong interest in anything that would reduce the
number of rooms at unionized hotels because of its commensurate effect on
union members; for instance, unions have taken positions on older, landmark
hotels’ efforts to modernize their often-smaller-than-current-market rooms.132
Thus, labor supports the hotels that face pressure and opposes loss of hotel
night stays from sharing economy companies facilitating the STR Market,
which do not provide union jobs.133
Some invested in the David and Goliath myth of the sharing economy
versus incumbent industries may view the only answer for the sharing econ-
omy to be one that breaks up these coalitions. That would be naı¨ve. Most of
these coalitions are based around very practical, non-ideological pursuits of
common success.134 In many cases, it might well be easy for sharing econ-
omy uses to position themselves as part of economic development, and even
a convention-oriented vision of a city. While some hoteliers might scoff at
the STR Market and its inclusion, the broader civic and retail coalition
would almost certainly welcome it as a participant given the sharing econo-
mies’ popularity and ability to open up new markets throughout the city.
started in 2007 when Joe Gebbia and Brian Chesky, then both 27, who had met five years
earlier at Rhode Island School of Design, were struggling to pay their rent. There was a design
conference coming to San Francisco and the city’s hotels were fully booked, so they came up
with the idea of renting out three airbeds on their living-room floor and cooking their guests
breakfast. The next day they created a website, airbedandbreakfast.com; six days later they had
a 30-year-old Indian man, a 35-year-old woman from Boston and a 45-year-old father of four
from Utah sleeping on their floor. They charged $80 each a night. [According to founder Brian
Chesky,] ‘[a]s we were waving these people goodbye Joe and I looked at each other and
thought, there’s got to be a bigger idea here.’”).
131 See Hotel Workers Win $15.37 Hotel Minimum Wage in Los Angeles, UNITE HERE!
(Oct. 14, 2014), http://unitehere.org/unite-here-helps-win-15-37-hotel-minimum-wage-in-los-
angeles/ [http://perma.cc/Y6JB-ME67] (“In September 2014, the Los Angeles City Council
voted 12-3 in favor of a historic new law creating a $15.37 per hour minimum wage for people
working in big hotels in Los Angeles.”).
132 See generally Stuart R. Korshak, Negotiating Trust in the San Francisco Hotel Indus-
try, KORSHAK, KRACOFF, KONG & SUGANO, LLP, http://www.kkks.com/articles/Negotiat-
ing%20Trust%20in%20the%20SF%20Hotel%20Industry.pdf [http://perma.cc/8T6N-MA8A].
133 See EXCLUSIVE: Airbnb Wants to Pay Taxes and Become a Legal Hotel, but Faces
Opposition from an Affordable Housing Group, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 21, 2014, 2:30 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/airbnb-bids-pay-taxes-faces-opposition-article-1.1763
073 [http://perma.cc/8WAG-XHM4] (“The Real Affordability for All Coalition—made up of
50 tenant advocate and labor union groups—is accusing Airbnb of ‘throwing gasoline on a
fire’ by contributing to a growing affordable housing crisis.”).
134 See, e.g., About Us, BAY AREA COUNCIL, http://www.bayareacouncil.org/about-us/
[http://perma.cc/5M8L-JG8S] (“Founded in 1945, as a way for the region’s business commu-
nity and like-minded individuals to concentrate and coordinate their efforts, the Bay Area
Council is widely respected by elected officials, policy makers and other civic leaders as the
regional voice of business in the Bay Area.”).
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4. Disrupting Market Participant
The disruptive market participant, such as Airbnb, has an obvious inter-
est: to make money. However, the sharing economy’s relation to and partici-
pation in the market has several other important elements that should be
noted.
First, the sharing economy companies—typically web platforms with
mobile phone app components—are to be commended for the use of tech-
nology to radically open up new markets and provide access to underutilized
resources. In the case of Airbnb and the STR Market, such uses were able to,
in a short time, provide a trusted platform with which millions of people
around the world chose to open up their private spaces and trust them to
strangers in ways previously inconceivable.135 That said, the technology
these sites utilize is, ultimately, not complicated. Indeed, numerous competi-
tors now crowd the STR Market, just as numerous competitors crowd all of
the sharing economy spaces. For the STR Market in particular, there are few
hard costs beyond the maintenance of the website and customer relations.136
That low barrier to entry helped with the stratospheric rise of sharing econ-
omy sites, such as Airbnb; however, it also means that other companies that
want to join the space similarly do not face high barriers to entry. This
means that sharing economy companies face a real threat of commodifica-
tion. There is little to differentiate Airbnb from VRBO or any other travel-
related sharing website other than branding. Indeed, a recent article noted
eight competitors already offer an identical web platform to Airbnb, most of
which are targeted to a specific segment of the STR Market.137 Among these
competitors has arisen an aggregator site, AlltheRooms.com, which searches
all of the sites and displays them in one viewing the way that Kayak.com
aggregates airline tickets.138
135 Cf. Transcript, Episode 533: It’s Not the Product, It’s the Person, THIS AMERICAN LIFE
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/533/transcript [http://
perma.cc/F3XZ-QQZR] (quoting Silicon Valley investor Chris Sacca telling story of first
hearing the Airbnb pitch: “Airbnb, multi-billion-dollar business, right? I was one of the first
people to see the Airbnb page. And I pulled them aside and said, guys, this is super dangerous.
You’re renting out a room in somebody’s house while they’re still there? Somebody’s going to
get raped or murdered, and the blood is gonna be on your hands. There’s no way this’ll suc-
ceed. That’s a $10 billion business today that I’m not an investor in.”).
136 See Barry Libert, Yoram (Jerry) Wind & Megan Beck Fenley, What Airbnb, Uber and
Alibaba Have in Common, HARV. BUS. REV.: STRATEGY (Nov. 20, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/
11/what-airbnb-uber-and-alibaba-have-in-common [https://perma.cc/7PJ4-2DA3] (“[Airbnb,
Uber, and Alibaba] represent a new trend in the types of business that investors prefer. Lead-
ers of more traditional companies are left wondering why these upstarts merit such high valua-
tions. Are they more profitable? Do they see faster growth? Do they have higher return on
assets and lower marginal costs? Our answer is yes—to all of the above.”).
137 See Stephanie Rosenbloom, Giving Airbnb a Run for Its Money, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/travel/giving-airbnb-a-run-for-its-money.html?ref
=travel&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7LLK-HDRN].
138 Id.
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Second, because of that low barrier to entry for competitors, sharing
economy uses can grow primarily through increasing the number of units
available for rent. As such, market growth for such companies depends upon
either more people choosing to share their units or, if that natural market
does not exist, then upon the STR Market getting into the world of real
estate. The web platforms could enter the brick-and-mortar world in one of
two ways: either the web platform begins to purchase or build new STR
Market units, or they indirectly convince the market to build units, owned by
private developers or speculators, that are primarily used for the STR Mar-
ket. Both of these choices are precarious for the STR Market in particular
because they challenge the narrative of “sharing” and begin to make the
STR Market look more like ordinary real estate speculation.139
Third, the commodification pressure of the industry means that the vari-
ous sharing economy businesses are essentially competing on price. To max-
imize profits, they have incentives to keep their operations as simple as
possible. For instance, even though it is conceivably simple for an operation
like Airbnb to collect taxes on rentals, just as a parking company collects
taxes on downtown parking spaces,140 the market in which Airbnb and its
competitors engage is fiercely price-conscious.141 Because of that, unless
Airbnb can be assured that all others in the STR Market will participate in
the collection of taxes, they will not want to do so because it makes their
rentals substantially higher in total cost. The only exception to this result
might be in the case where a company like Airbnb would be able to gain
some market advantage by being the easiest method for an STR Market
rental to achieve compliance in a highly regulated market. For instance, an
aggressive regulatory approach going after those in the STR Market not pay-
ing transient occupancy taxes in a city would likely encourage participants to
seek out a company that eased compliance headaches.
Finally, in some cases, sharing economy uses have a substantial market
opportunity, in large part because of—not in spite of—the illegality of their
product. For instance, in the STR Market, Airbnb and its competitors were
able to assert dominance because of the illegality of what they offer: tran-
sient occupancy primarily in residential neighborhoods that do not pay tran-
sient occupancy taxes.142 This is a market in which major hoteliers would
139 See infra Part V (describing use of Airbnb site by commercial operators to run de facto
hotels in residential neighborhoods).
140 See S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REG. CODE § 6.6-1(f) (2015) (requiring operators of park-
ing garages to collect, report, and remit any tax imposed to city).
141 Carolyn Said, Airbnb Spawns Array of Companies to Aid Hosts, S.F.GATE (Mar. 2,
2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Airbnb-spawns-array-of-companies-
to-aid-hosts-5282838.php [http://perma.cc/S54N-KAMD] (discussing companies emerging to
add value to commodified listings).
142 See S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REG. CODE art. 7 (2015); Tax on Transient Occupancy of
Hotel Rooms, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., TREASURER & TAX COLLECTOR, http://sftreasurer.org/
tax-transient-occupancy-hotel-rooms [http://perma.cc/D533-ZKL4] (interpreting code
provisions).
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love to compete; however, publicly-traded companies have never sought to
engage in such a business because publicly traded companies would face
substantial local regulatory issues, as well as potential securities violations
for engaging in illegal behavior.143 As a result, the illegality of the sharing
economy uses, in fact, provides a shield for these companies from their more
established counterparts that participate in, and dominate, the legal markets
like hoteliers.
5. Residential Property Owners and Renters
The sharing economy raises a number of important issues with regard
to established personal and real property relationships. Because this Article
focuses on the STR Market, this section will focus on several aspects of how
the sharing economy can require owners of real property to renegotiate well-
established relationships that, most likely, did not contemplate sharing econ-
omy uses at the time of their creation. In addition, such issues provide a road
map for future real property transactions because all such transactions must
expect that sharing uses are reasonably foreseeable within the general popu-
lation in the future.144
One place where sharing economy uses especially rise to the fore is in
multi-unit buildings. Most multi-unit buildings have some sort of document
that governs, at a minimum, how common areas—swimming pools, com-
mon hallways, foyers, laundry rooms, elevators, and so on—will be man-
aged.145 Such documents also typically provide some mechanism for
negotiating the common quiet enjoyment of such units. Further, such docu-
ments tend to have requirements related to subletting of a unit.146  Violation
of all of these terms, among others, could be implicated by rental of a unit in
the STR Market, and thus subject a unit owner to potential fines by the
boards that oversee the community rules. Because the STR Market has fo-
cused upon dense, urban areas, these types of issues have tended to arise
primarily within the multi-unit building context. However, they might also
just as easily apply in suburban neighborhoods that are governed by CC&Rs
that are overseen by a homeowner’s association. Documents governing com-
mon spaces in multi-unit buildings, as well as CC&Rs for homeowner’s as-
143 See supra Part II and note 20 (describing applicable securities regulations related to R
reporting of illegal activity).
144 In many states, realtor groups maintain standardized forms that, typically, inure to the
benefit of the landlord and are maintained on a regular basis to keep up with changes in state
statutory and case law. Although these model forms may be considered to address sharing
economy uses through broad provisions covering things such as subletting, it is also worth
considering the amendment of these model forms to explicitly reference short-term rentals.
145 JOHN PAUL HANNA & DAVID VAN ATTA, CALIFORNIA COMMON INTEREST DEVELOP-
MENT LAW & PRACTICE § 1:33 (2014) (“Most declarations for common interest developments
contain use restrictions relative to the lot or unit owners’ use of project common areas and,
often, their separate interests.”).
146 Id. at § 5:10 (describing subletting as a default condition of common provisions).
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sociations, will almost certainly need to be re-written to address, and to
anticipate, the growth of the STR Market.
The STR Market can also cause problems in the context of residential
leases. For instance, most standard residential leases either forbid subletting,
or otherwise require notification of guests staying longer than a stated period
of time.147 Many lessees are unaware that short-term rentals may violate such
terms and that such a violation could permit the landlord to terminate the
lease.148 Such termination could be especially traumatic for those tenants in
rent-controlled or rent-subsidized units that are paying below market rent
and could not afford to live in that location at market prices.149
Another issue arising with the STR Market is whether the potential for
sharing economy uses is, in fact, driving up the cost of rental units. These
theories proffer several potential rationales. Among them is that landlords in
areas where the STR Market is booming expect that the unit will be shared
and thus charge accordingly, and that landlords are taking units off the rental
market and instead placing them on the STR Market because it generates
more revenue. While there is evidence that both may be occurring in isolated
instances, several robust studies have found that, at this time, the STR Mar-
ket has not had an appreciable difference on real estate purchase prices or
rents in American cities.150
6. Neighborhoods
Many of the units in the STR Markets are in residential neighborhoods;
these units are, after all, typically someone’s home that he or she uses most
of the year.151 The market pressure for this kind of experience is immense;
147 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA ASS’N OF REALTORS, FORM LR: RESIDENTIAL LEASE OR MONTH-
TO-MONTH RENTAL AGREEMENT § 21 (2012), http://tmdgi.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
lease.pdf [http://perma.cc/7F2X-SKZ6] (restricting subletting).
148 Carolyn Said, Airbnb Sublets in S.F. Land Some Renters in the Doghouse, S.F.GATE
(Mar. 18, 2014, 9:38 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Airbnb-sublets-in-S-F-
land-some-renters-in-the-5326019.php [http://perma.cc/WA7N-FWAM].
149 San Francisco listed this as one of the three major reasons for enacting its ordinance.
See S.F., CAL. ORD. no. 218–14, General Findings § 1(c)(1) (2014) (“The goal of regulation is
to ensure compliance with all requirements of the Municipal Code, including but not limited to
the Business and Tax Regulations Code and the Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration
Ordinance, and accountability for neighborhood quality of life.”).
150 Compare Kenneth Rosen, Short-Term Rentals and the Housing Market, URBAN LAND
(Nov. 22, 2013), http://urbanland.uli.org/news/short-term-rentals-and-the-housing-market/
[http://perma.cc/F6F6-RPCS] (“One of the latest theories posits that the ‘sharing economy’
and short-term rentals are to blame for high rents. But not only is there no evidence to suggest
that short-term rentals are making homes less affordable, our research and analysis indicate
that home sharing has the potential to make urban housing more affordable for more fami-
lies.”), with Rachel Monroe, More Guests, Empty Houses, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2014, 8:08 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/02/airbnb_gentrification_how_the_
sharing_economy_drives_up_housing_prices.html [http://perma.cc/9UT4-KES6] (describing
rise of commercial Airbnb operators in small tourist town of Marfa, Texas).
151 See, e.g., Study: Airbnb Pushing Renters Out of Hot Neighborhoods, THE REAL DEAL
(July 29, 2015, 9:10 AM), http://therealdeal.com/blog/2015/07/29/study-airbnb-pushing-rent-
ers-out-of-hot-neighborhoods/#sthash.S8F17UPk.dpuf [http://perma.cc/F3Q2-PNMT] (“The
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Airbnb notes that, “[t]o date, hosts have welcomed over 11 million travelers
who wanted to experience cities not as tourists, but as locals.  76% of Airbnb
travelers want to explore a specific neighborhood, and 89% want to ‘live like
a local.’” 152 Even the CEO of Marriott, Arne Sorenson, noted that the benefit
of Airbnb is that it gives tourists access to neighborhoods that hotels
cannot.153
In larger cities, the neighborhoods tourists want to explore are often
considered quiet redoubts of space away from the hurly burly of the com-
mercial districts. Even in smaller cities, neighborhoods are defined by the
nature of how public space interplays with private living. In urban areas, a
sense of safety is often defined by expectations about the urban fabric, and
people choose neighborhoods in some cases on expectations about its re-
sidents: it is a “gay” neighborhood; a “hip” neighborhood; a “family”
neighborhood; a “safe” neighborhood.154 In suburban areas, children ride
bikes on sidewalks and parents grant liberties to their children based upon
expectations of what that neighborhood is. The rapid rise of the STR Market
can change all of that. The sudden influx of tourists into such neighborhoods
could disrupt the environment that locals strive to build. This disruption may
be the STR Market’s Achilles’ heel, making cities sit up, take notice, and
consider aggressive regulations like bans. For instance, two Los Angeles
councilmen recently introduced a resolution that would begin investigating
the regulation of the STR Market. So many homes have been converted to
short-term rentals they have, according to the councilmen, “begun to change
the stable and familiar feel of many residential neighborhoods.”155
This issue of neighborhood effects is exacerbated in certain areas, typi-
cally fashionable areas of town, where tourists often desire to spend time.
These “hot spots” require special attention because they often define a city’s
character. Losing the people in those neighborhoods that make them unique
could prove a tremendous loss to the sense of place that drives both high-
value knowledge workers and tourists to the area.
most popular neighborhood for Airbnb rentals [in New York City], the East Village, saw 28
percent of rental units converted into illegal hotel rooms, according to the analysis by the New
York Communities for Change and Real Affordability For All. The 20 most popular neighbor-
hoods as a whole lost about 10 percent of their units, the New York Daily News reported.”).
152 David Hantman, Airbnb Economic Impact Around the World, AIRBNB (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/airbnb-economic-impact-around-the-world/ [http://perma.cc/
2DQG-CD72].
153 Brad Tuttle, Marriott’s CEO Just Made a Pretty Good Sales Pitch for . . . Airbnb?,
MONEY (July 9, 2014), http://time.com/money/2964290/marriott-airbnb-arne-sorenson-neigh-
borhoods/ [http://perma.cc/B9JF-J6PW] (quoting Marriott’s CEO comment that “I want to
experience a neighborhood, even if I’m on vacation”).
154 See generally Stephen R. Miller, Legal Neighborhoods, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 105
(2013) (discussing numerous sociological, jurisdictional, and legal conceptions of the
neighborhood).
155 Hugo Martin, L.A. to Consider Regulating Airbnb and Other Short-term Home Rentals,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-regulating-short-term-home-
rentals-20141202-story.html [http://perma.cc/B6F9-9HFQ] (quoting Mike Bonin and Herb
Wesson, two Los Angeles councilmen).
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While giving ample consideration to these concerns, cities must also try
to divine the long-term relationship a particular city will have with sharing
economy uses. It may be that the sharing economy reimagines the nature of
our relationships, our sense of place, and our neighborhoods. For instance,
right now, we tend to imagine the person who comes to our neighborhood in
an STR Market rental as a stranger; however, it may not be long until we
view these “strangers” as potential weak ties: people from around the coun-
try, maybe even the world, who have come into our backyard and are look-
ing for engagement.156 That engagement, in time, may yield a type of
friendship and relationship—the sharing economy friendship—similar to the
kinds of weak ties people used to establish only when backpacking through
Europe and staying in hostels. Perhaps such place-bound, temporary friend-
ships will prove more real and lasting than any Facebook “friend” ever was.
Indeed, Airbnb has noted the possibility of changing this dynamic, even do-
nating $1 million to a fund called “one less stranger” to encourage its visi-
tors to engage the strangers in host communities.157 If this change occurs, it
will require a redefinition of what constitutes a neighborhood that will take
time to reinvent itself.
III. EXISTING APPROACHES TO REGULATING THE SHARING ECONOMY
This section seeks to create the beginning of a taxonomy of existing
regulatory approaches to the sharing economy, especially as related to the
STR Market. As this is a fast-changing area of regulation, the variety of
tools used to regulate such uses is likely to swell and become more nuanced.
In addition, the variety of tools used at this point largely fall into several
categories that are used throughout the country, and even the world. While
this section attempts to be representative of the regulatory tools being used
now, the intent is not to be exhaustive of all uses of a given tool. As a guide
to regulation, this section relies most heavily upon recent ordinances passed
by San Francisco and Portland to regulate the STR Market, both of which are
regarded as at the forefront of the regulatory response, as well as several
other ordinances from across the country.
A. Bans
The traditional command-and-control approach to addressing real or
perceived threats posed by sharing economy uses such as the STR Market is
156 See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. OF SOC. 1360, 1371
(1973).
157 Creating #Onelessstranger: Stories of Belonging, AIRBNB, http://blog.airbnb.com/cre-
ating-onelessstranger-stories-belonging/ [http://perma.cc/L68T-EDFJ] (“Our mission is to
create a world where all 7 Billion people can Belong Anywhere. So, in 2015, we are taking
steps toward making that happen by creating a global, social experiment, #OneLessStranger at
a time.”).
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to ban the use altogether. In practice, a ban has several major problems.
First, it is likely to simply drive the STR Market underground. While such
regulation may succeed in eliminating listings of sites on major websites,
such as Airbnb, it would be almost impossible to guard all possible websites
from engaging in the type of peer-to-peer sharing that now occurs. Second,
in the long-term, such an approach is likely to appear heavy-handed even to
those in neighborhoods that see the most negative effects of the STR Market.
While some may wish to have no STR Market, part of the population would
likely want to engage in the STR Market. Third, if a ban cannot be effec-
tively conducted at the web platform level, then the ban would likely require
an invasive use of force to prove that a home was rented on the STR Market,
which would seemingly prove too draconian for the violation committed in
most cases. If there was a failure to adequately enforce such a ban, then the
city risks being perceived as ineffective and also loses significant bargaining
power with the STR Market. For these reasons, among others, bans on the
STR Market are almost certain to fail in the long-term.
On the other hand, bans might also be conceived of as de facto morato-
ria on the STR Market while planning processes catch up with such uses.
Although moratoria have the same enforcement problems discussed above,
they can also lead to a period of intense negotiation between the STR Market
websites and the regulatory body.
Perhaps the best-known ban in the United States, at present, is in New
Orleans, Louisiana.158 New Orleans’ ordinance: defines illegal short-term
rentals as any rental for a period of fewer than thirty days (sixty days in the
Vieux Carre´) for which there is no license or permit; notes that advertising
and solicitation for illegal short-term rentals is a violation; and states that
periodicals advertising such rentals, and those who rent such properties from
the owners, are not in violation.159 However, the city has found the ban diffi-
cult to enforce for many of the reasons outlined above.160
B. Use Definitions
The regulatory response to the STR Market begins with the language
that defines a unit in the STR Market, as well as language clarifying whether
a legal STR Market rental changes the use of a building. In San Francisco,
for instance, the city’s STR market legislation is based around the definition
158 See Tania Dall, Councilwoman Head Looks to Regulate Short-Term Rentals, Groups
Respond, WWLTV.COM (Jan. 23, 2015, 10:45 PM), http://www.wwltv.com/story/news/2015/
01/23/new-orleans-city-council-pres-stacy-head-looks-to-regulate-short-term-rentals-groups-
respond/22260363/ [http://perma.cc/B7TG-9YAA].
159 NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 54-491.1 (2004), https://www.municode
.com/library/la/new_orleans/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICO_CH54CRCO_ART
VIIOFGE_S54-491.1PROFREPR [https://perma.cc/M8AL-47CV].
160 Nina Feldman, Short-Term Rental Stakeholders All Agree on One Thing: Current Law
Inadequate, WWNO.COM (July 18, 2014), http://wwno.org/post/short-term-rental-stakehold-
ers-all-agree-one-thing-current-law-inadequate [http://perma.cc/5UB9-8UWL].
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of a “short-term residential rental.” Under the San Francisco definition, a
short-term residential rental is any residential unit occupied for less than
thirty days where the residential unit is offered for tourist or transient use by
a “permanent resident.”161 A permanent resident is defined as an owner or
lessee who has occupied the residential unit for at least sixty consecutive
days with the intent to establish that unit as a permanent residence.162 The
permanent resident must also be a natural person, which limits commercial
enterprises from entering into the short-term rental market.163 The unit must
also be registered with a registry,164 and must not be a part of any of the
city’s affordable housing programs.165 San Francisco has also amended its
definitions of what constitutes a “dwelling unit,” a “live/work unit,” and a
“residential use” to explicitly state that compliant short-term rentals “do not
alter the use type” of the respective uses.166
The Portland ordinance defines the STR market as an “accessory use”
to a primary use,167 and also eliminated the “bed and breakfast” use category
replacing it with the “accessory short-term rentals” use.168 The Portland ordi-
nance defines an “accessory short-term rental” and one where “an individ-
ual or family resides in a dwelling unit and rents bedrooms to overnight
guests for fewer than 30 days.”169 Further, such units are divided into two
types; “Type A” accessory short-term rentals are “where no more than 2
bedrooms are rented to overnight guests,”170 while “Type B” accessory
short-term rentals are “where 3 or more bedrooms are rented to overnight
guests.”171 Both Type A and Type B accessory short-term rentals are only
allowed “when accessory to a Household Living use.”172
The Portland ordinance also distinguishes between a “resident,” which
is defined as “the individual or family who resides in the dwelling unit,”
which can be “the owner or a long-term renter,” and an “operator,” which is
defined as “the resident or a person or entity that is designated by the resi-
dent to manage the accessory short-term rental.”173
C. Day Limits on STR Market Use
The San Francisco short-term rental ordinance requires that the resident
occupy the residential unit for no fewer than 275 days out of a calendar
161 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.4 (2015).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE §§ 102.7, 102.13, 790.88 (2015).
167 PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE §§ 33.120.100, 33.120.110, 33.110.110 (2015).
168 Id. § 33.270.070.
169 Id. § 33.207.020(A).
170 Id. § 33.207.020(A)(1).
171 Id. § 33.207.020(A)(2).
172 Id. §§ 33.207.040(A)(3), 33.207.050(A)(3).
173 Id. § 33.207.020(B).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL107.txt unknown Seq: 41 20-JAN-16 10:22
2016] First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy 187
year.174 Similarly, the Portland ordinance requires both Type A and Type B
accessory short-term rental residents to occupy the dwelling unit for at least
270 days during each calendar year.175
D. Licenses and Permits
Almost all business uses within a city require a basic business license,
which is typically a nominal fee for small businesses.176 In most cases, the
justification for a business license is largely informational: it permits the city
to obtain data about the nature of commerce within the city.177 Licenses and
permits also allow a city to easily remedy the impacts of bad actors.
Opponents of licensure point to situations where licensing is used by
dominant market forces as a way to impose costs on small operators that
drive out such competition.178 This rebuttal speaks primarily to the impor-
tance of limiting licensure as a barrier to entry and preventing agency cap-
ture, while still allowing licensure to serve its function of collecting
information and, in extreme cases, regulating bad actors.
In the two examples of STR Market regulations evaluated in-depth
here, San Francisco’s ordinance requires residential units to maintain a valid
business registration certificate,179 while Portland’s ordinance maintains a
more complex regulatory structure.180 Portland requires that Type A acces-
sory short-term rentals obtain a permit while Type B accessory short-term
rentals must obtain a conditional use permit.181 The Type A permit must be
obtained every two years and requires the resident or operator to abide by
certain requirements.182 These requirements include: a “notification letter”
describing the “operation”;183 the number of bedrooms that will be rented to
overnight guests;184 information on how to contact the resident or operator
174 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(A) (2015).
175 PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE § 33.207.040(A)(1) (2015).
176 See, e.g., New Business Registration, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., TREASURER & TAX
COLLECTOR, http://sftreasurer.org/registration#RateSchedule/FeeCalculation [http://perma.cc/
V8AB-GQYY] (putting forth rate structure for business licenses beginning at $75).
177 See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, supra note 120, at 3 (“[L]icensing helps to en- R
sure high-quality services, safeguard against serious harms, and offer workers clear guidelines
around professional development and training.”).
178 See OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, supra note 120, at 56 (“[T]he practice of licensing can R
impose substantial costs on job seekers, consumers, and the economy more generally. This is
particularly true when licensing regulations are poorly aligned toward consumer protection and
when they are not updated to reflect a changing economy.”); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 579 (1973) (recognizing that pecuniary incentives were sufficiently powerful to prohibit
members of the Alabama Board of Optometry from participating in license revocation pro-
ceedings of optometrists practicing in a competing branch of the profession).
179 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(2)(C) (2015).
180 See PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE §§ 33.207.010–33.207.070 (2015).
181 Id.
182 Id. § 33.207.040(C).
183 Id.
184 Id. § 33.207.040(C)(1).
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by phone;185 and how the relevant standards of the code are met.186 The noti-
fication letter must be mailed or delivered to “all . . . recognized organiza-
tions” that share property boundaries, including that property where the
accessory short-term rental is located, and all owners of property abutting or
across the street from the accessory short-term rental.187 The permit applica-
tion has to include an application, a copy of the notification letter and ad-
dresses and organizations that received the notice.188 The permit can be
revoked for failure to comply with the code sections, in which case no new
Type A permit will be issued to that resident for two years at the site.189 The
Type B accessory short-term rental requires a conditional use review typical
of most cities.190
E. Registries and Information Sharing
San Francisco has adopted one of the most detailed registry require-
ments in the country. Under the San Francisco registry, a unit must complete
an application that is good for a two-year term if accepted.191 In some zoning
districts, the city also notifies any homeowner association that has requested
notice of such applications.192 The application requires prospective hosts to
make an affirmative showing that, in general, the applicant lives in the unit
and maintains the required insurance and business insurance.193 A renewal
application is required to provide evidence that the applicant has occupied
the unit for at least 275 days of each of the two preceding calendar years.194
The application fee is currently $50, but can be adjusted later to cover the
costs of the registry.195 The registry requires that the host remain in “good
standing” by submitting a quarterly report to the Planning Department start-
ing on January 1 of each year stating the number of days the unit, or any
portion thereof, was rented in the STR Market.196
Portland requires all accessory short-term rentals to maintain a “guest
log book,” which must include the names and home addresses of guests,
guest’s license plate numbers if traveling by car, dates of stay, and the room
assigned to each guest.197 The log must be available for inspection by city
staff upon request.198
185 Id. § 33.207.040(C)(2).
186 Id. § 33.207.040(C)(3).
187 Id. § 33.207.040(C)(1)(b)(1).
188 Id. § 33.207.040(C)(2).
189 Id. § 33.207.040(D).
190 Id. § 33.207.050(A)(2).
191 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(3)(A) (2015).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. § 41A.5(g)(3)(B).
196 Id. § 41A.5(g)(3)(C).
197 PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE § 33.207.060 (2015).
198 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL107.txt unknown Seq: 43 20-JAN-16 10:22
2016] First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy 189
F. Hosting Platform Required to Inform Posting Host of Applicable Law
The San Francisco ordinance requires any web platform hosting an STR
Market rental to first inform the posting host of the applicable legal provi-
sions governing the transaction.199 Failure to comply with this provision sub-
jects the hosting platform to a potential penalty of $1,000 per day.200
Portland also requires that the Type A permit number or Type B conditional
use case file number be included in all advertising and other listing services,
and must further be prominently displayed in the rental unit so as to be seen
by all short-term occupants.201
G. Rent Control and the STR Market
A major concern for cities with rent control ordinances, which typically
require a landlord to limit rent increases on a tenant so long as the tenant
abides by the terms of the lease, is that tenants engaging in the STR Market
almost certainly violate general rental agreement policies on subletting.
Landlords anxious for higher rents have seized on this as a reason to evict
such rent-controlled tenants.202 To address this concern, some cities, such as
San Francisco, have amended their rent control ordinances to prevent land-
lords from trying to evict the resident of a rent controlled unit “solely as a
result of a first violation” of the rent control ordinance “that has been cured
within 30 days written notice to the tenant.”203
H. Taxes, Impact Fees, and Exactions
A major issue for many cities is the collection of taxes and, in particu-
lar, the transient occupancy taxes and fees. In some cities, the STR Market
web platforms have agreed to begin collecting these taxes and remitting
them to the city. San Francisco’s ordinance requires the hosting platform to
collect and remit the city’s transient occupancy taxes, as well as maintain a
record that illustrates that the taxes remitted accurately correspond to rentals
associated with that hosting platform.204 Airbnb is currently collecting the
14% transient occupancy tax for San Francisco.205 Similarly, in Portland,
Airbnb pays the Oregon transient lodging tax (1%); the Multnomah County
Transient Lodging Tax (11.5%); and the Portland transient lodging tax
(6%).206 As of August 2015, Airbnb also collects transient occupancy taxes
199 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(4)(A) (2015).
200 Id. § 41A.5(g)(4)(C).
201 PORTLAND, OR., ADMIN. CODE § 6.04.060(d) (2015).
202 See supra Part II.J.5 and note 148. R
203 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.9(a)(4) (2015).
204 Id. § 41A.5(g)(4)(B).
205 What Local Taxes Apply to My Listing and How Do I Collect Them?, AIRBNB, https://
www.airbnb.com/help/article/653 [http://perma.cc/E6EC-CZF6].
206 Id.
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for Chicago, the District of Columbia, Malibu, Oakland, Palo Alto, Philadel-
phia, Phoenix, San Diego, San Jose, and the States of North Carolina and
Rhode Island.207 Internationally, Airbnb collects a “tourist tax” for Amster-
dam, The Netherlands, and the Chamonix-Mont-Blanc region of France, as
well as a “service tax” in the country of India.208
In addition to the transient occupancy tax, however, cities in areas
where property taxes are not easily adjusted in accordance with real estate
market prices, such as California post-Proposition 13, also depend heavily
on impact fees and exactions from new development to pay for infrastruc-
ture.209 Thus far, no regulation is known to address how sharing economy
uses and cities will address whether impact fees and exactions should be
collected, much less assessed, for these de minimis uses that might, in aggre-
gate, yield substantial impacts on cities.
I. Tax Evasion by Hosts
Another approach that some cities are considering is pursuing tax eva-
sion prosecution against the STR Market host. Although San Francisco’s or-
dinance places the burden of collecting and remitting transient occupancy
taxes on the web platform, it also places liability on the host in the case that
the web platform does not collect and remit the taxes.210
In addition, the registry required by San Francisco establishes a record
of commercial transactions that federal and state tax officials can now use to
track and tax STR Market revenue, which likely went unreported previously.
J. Minimum Standards for Rentals
Portland’s ordinance provides detailed standards that apply to both
types of accessory short-term rentals under its ordinances. For Type A acces-
sory short-term rentals, the rental is limited to a maximum of 2 bedrooms to
overnight guests211 while a Type B accessory short-term rental is limited to a
maximum of 5 bedrooms.212 For both Type A uses, in sites with an accessory
dwelling unit, such as an “in-law” or “granny” unit, the resident can live in
the primary or accessory dwelling unit and rent bedrooms in either dwelling
unit, so long as the maximum number of bedrooms rented on the site to
overnight guests is two.213 Similarly, for both Type A and Type B uses, a
bedroom in a detached accessory structure can be rented overnight and
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, A PRIMER ON CALIFORNIA CITY FINANCE 5 (2005)
(“Among cities that impose a [transient occupancy tax], it provides 7 percent of a city’s gen-
eral revenues on average and often as much as 17 percent.”).
210 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(4)(B) (2015).
211 PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE § 33.207.040(B)(1) (2015).
212 Id. § 33.207.050(B)(1).
213 Id. § 33.207.040(B)(2).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL107.txt unknown Seq: 45 20-JAN-16 10:22
2016] First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy 191
counts toward the maximum site limit.214 In both Type A and Type B uses,
Portland’s building department is required to verify that each bedroom rented
to overnight guests meets the building code requirements for a sleeping
room at the time it was created or converted,215 has a smoke detector that is
interconnected with a smoke detector in an adjacent hallway,216 and is lo-
cated on a floor of a dwelling unit equipped with a functioning carbon mon-
oxide alarm, if there is a source of carbon monoxide onsite.217 For a Type A
use, the number of guests in the house may not exceed the relevant “house-
hold” definition for that zoning area,218 while for a Type B use the number of
guests can be limited by the conditional use permit.219
For a Type A use, nonresident employees are prohibited, though typical
household repair services are allowed,220 while a Type B use may permit
nonresident employees for activities such as booking rooms and food prepa-
ration as part of the conditional use review, and hired service for normal
maintenance is allowed.221 The number of employees and the frequency of
employee auto trips to the facility may be limited or monitored as part of a
conditional use approval.222
Serving alcohol and food to overnight guests and visitors is allowed
under both Type A and Type B uses.223 Commercial meetings, such as lunch-
eons, banquets, parties, weddings, meetings, charitable fund raising, and
commercial or advertising activities are prohibited with a Type A accessory
short-term rental.224 With a Type B use, commercial meetings are similarly
prohibited in single-dwelling zones and, in all other zones, they are limited
to up to twenty-four commercial meetings per year as part of a conditional
use review, with the maximum number of visitors or guests per event deter-
mined through the conditional use review.225 A “meeting log” of all com-
mercial meetings held must be kept, including the number of visitors or
guests at each event, and must be available for inspection by city staff upon
request.226 Type B uses are additionally prohibited from structural alterations
that would alter their future use as a residence, including alterations with a
non-residential appearance, such as the installation of more than three park-
ing spaces, paving of required setbacks, and commercial-type exterior
lighting.227
214 Id. §§ 33.207.040(B)(3), 33.207.050(B)(3).
215 Id. §§ 33.207.040(B)(4)(a), 33.207.050(B)(4)(a).
216 Id. §§ 33.207.040(B)(4)(b), 3.207.050(B)(4)(b).
217 Id. §§ 33.207.040(B)(4)(c), 33.207.050(B)(4)(c).
218 Id. § 33.207.040(B)(5).
219 Id. § 33.207.050(B)(5).
220 Id. § 33.207.040(B)(6).
221 Id. § 33.207.050(B)(6).
222 Id.
223 Id. §§ 33.207.040(B)(7), 33.207.050(B)(7).
224 Id. § 33.207.040(B)(8).
225 Id. § 33.207.050(B)(8).
226 Id.
227 Id. § 33.207.040(B)(9).
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K. On-site Property Manager
In some locations, the cities are requiring an on-site property manager,
a style of vacation rental management that is typical of resort destinations. In
Moses Lake, Washington, short-term rentals must have an on-site property
manager within thirty minutes of the site.228
L. Minimum Age
A few cities have had concerns with the possibility that minors might
be renting units in STR Markets and thus are seeking to impose a minimum
age for rentals. For instance, Indio, California, in the Coachella Valley, re-
cently raised the minimum age limit for short-term rentals from eighteen to
twenty-one.229
M. Liability Insurance
Some cities are requiring that the STR Market website provide liability
insurance for the rental. Most of the major market participants have already
implemented liability insurance that applies to all rentals, even those rentals
in jurisdictions where the requirement does not apply. San Francisco’s ordi-
nance requires that the host, or the website platform through which they rent
their unit, must provide insurance of at least $500,000 that defends and in-
demnifies the unit owner as an insured, as well as any tenant in the building,
for bodily injury and property damage arising from short-term rental.230
N. Good Neighbor Regulations: Noise, Parking, Trash
Some cities are also specifically requiring that STR Market units com-
ply with those “good neighbor” regulations that are already typically ap-
plied in many residential zoning districts. Such regulations include: noise
ordinances, which typically require a quiet time during the evening and also
limit commercial activity during evening hours; parking regulations that
govern things such as on-street parking and special parking permits that ap-
ply in residential zones; and trash guidelines that might be of particular con-
cern in larger buildings. For instance, Saugatuck, Michigan, is considering a
noise ordinance to deal with complaints of short-term rentals in residential
neighborhoods. One proposal would include a “noise test” where “a police
228 Richard Byrd, Moses Lake City Council to Regulate Vacation Rental Dwellings Within
City, COLUMBIA BASIN HERALD (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.columbiabasinherald.com/polit-
ics/article_5456f992-80cb-11e4-af13-4ff2e7c83258.html [http://perma.cc/V2PD-XPKR].
229 Tatiana Sanchez, Indio Re-visits Vacation Rental Regulations, DESERT SUN (Nov. 6,
2014, 7:55 AM), http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/local/2014/11/06/indio-re-visits-vaca-
tion-rental-regulations/18578619/ [http://perma.cc/J3ZX-5F9X].
230 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(D) (2015).
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officer or city staff would use a decibel meter to compare sound levels near
the rental homes with levels in the general neighborhood.”231 According to
reports, the tests would be done ten times per night, for an undetermined
time period.232
O. Compliance with Other Laws
The San Francisco ordinance requires the unit owner to demonstrate
that the property where the unit is located is not subject to any outstanding
notices of violation or similar abatement orders or civil actions.233
P. Stakeholder Participation
As the STR Market continues to grow, the cities will need to increas-
ingly consider the role of stakeholders in how they craft their ordinances.
Establishing a working committee for such regulations is a good idea. Such a
committee should include representatives of the interest groups in the com-
munity, perhaps a group similar to the varied interests referenced in the dis-
cussion above. How such a group forms, and the work it does, will be unique
to the particular community engaging the process. Nonetheless, the need for
this discussion is clear because of the innovative and personal nature of the
STR Market.
Q. Administrative Enforcement
For violations of its ordinance, San Francisco also created an adminis-
trative enforcement process using its already established administrative hear-
ing officer program, which is modeled on state and federal administrative
law judges.234 The process also establishes administrative penalties for viola-
tion of the ordinance. For the initial violation, the penalty is “not more than
four times the standard hourly administrative rate of $121.00” per day of
non-compliance after a notice of violation is served for each unit, or for
“each identified failure” of a hosting platform to comply with the require-
ments.235 For a second violation, the penalty goes up to “not more than eight
231 Alex Shabad, Saugatuck residents clash with tourists over noise, WZZM.COM (Oct. 23,
2014, 7:30 PM), http://www.wzzm13.com/story/news/local/2014/10/23/homeowners-clash-
tourists-noise/17794697/ [http://perma.cc/F6TR-4PPB].
232 Id.
233 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(H) (2015) (requiring unit owners to show no
outstanding “Building, Electrical, Plumbing, Mechanical, Fire, Health, Housing, Police, or
Planning Code enforcement, including any notices of violation, notices to cure, orders of
abatement, cease and desist orders, or correction notices,” and warning “[t]he Department
shall not include a property that is subject to any such outstanding violations in the Registry”).
234 Id. §§ 41A.6(a)–(e) (2015).
235 Id. § 41A.6(d)(1)(A).
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times the standard hourly administrative rate of $121.00” per day,236 and for
the third and subsequent violations the penalty goes up to “not more than
twelve times the standard hourly administrative rate of $121.00” per day.237
Repeat violators are also removed from the required registry for one year.238
Portland also uses its administrative enforcement ordinance as a means
of enforcing compliance.239
R. Annual City Reporting Requirement on Regulation
San Francisco maintains an annual reporting requirement of the Plan-
ning Department’s STR Market regulation, which should assist in further
facilitating and refining the regulatory program.240
S. Existing Approaches and First Principles
This section sought to briefly analyze the collective existing regulatory
strategies in light of the first principles announced in Part II. First, these
regulations are generally in line with the principle that the sharing economy
requires a differentiated response (Principle 1), because they specifically
seek to address the STR Market.
Bans of the STR Market violate a number of the principles, especially
daylighting (Principle 2) and implementing a response beyond traditional
regulation (Principle 8). Perhaps more importantly, bans also fail to recog-
nize how the STR Market is changing existing markets (Principle 5), creat-
ing new markets (Principle 6), and disrupting established regulatory
structures (Principle 7). It is no wonder that most jurisdictions that have
enacted bans are now considering alternative approaches.
The rest of the existing approaches to regulation presented here are
gleaned primarily from San Francisco and Portland, two cities that have in-
vested heavily in a strong land use-based regulatory response to the STR
Market. These approaches have their benefits. First, both the San Francisco
and Portland ordinances have informational components (Principle 3) to
their programs—registries and conditional use permit applications—that
will facilitate important data collection that can assist in further refining
these programs in the future. Legalizing at least some STR Market activity
has the effect of daylighting some of this activity (Principle 2); however, it
may be that the ordinances are too complicated and challenging to imple-
ment for small participants in the market that the regulations end up driving
such uses underground once more. This could be especially problematic. If
236 Id. § 41A.6(d)(1)(B).
237 Id. § 41A.6(d)(1)(C).
238 Id. § 41A.6(d)(2).
239 PORTLAND, OR., ADMIN. CODE § 3.30.040(D)(5) (2015).
240 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(8) (2015).
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legalized STR Market uses face complicated regulatory hurdles, while non-
legalized STR Market uses continue unabated, the impetus to obey the rules
diminishes substantially.
The San Francisco and Portland ordinances both recognize the potential
for the corporatization of the STR Market (Principles 5, 6), an important
provision that the market may soon challenge. These ordinances also try to
use traditional command-and-control land use tools that will likely be diffi-
cult to implement or, if they are implemented, risk being seen as draconian
when applied to an occasional host or traveler (Principles 7, 8, 9). The ordi-
nances are most likely to be used to go after the “super-users” of the STR
Market: those users that are hosting travelers more than they are living in
their spaces. For those uses, the complexity of regulations may make sense.
However, many de minimis users—those that host or travel using the STR
Market just a few times a year—will likely find that these regulations do not
respect their interests and demand a more nuanced response from their local
governments. Thus, while the San Francisco and Portland options represent a
first step towards effective STR Market regulation, they will likely need to
be re-envisioned as the STR Market evolves and problems with these tradi-
tional regulatory approaches emerge. The possibility of altered regulations is
especially likely given that these elaborate regulatory structures have largely
been flouted since their implementation. A May 2015 study found that there
were 5,459 short-term rentals in San Francisco advertised on Airbnb and
related sites but only about 700 of the hosts had registered as required by the
city and at least 350 of the listings were for full-time vacation rentals despite
the ninety day per year limitation.241 Portland faces a similar dilemma. De-
spite requiring permits for STRs since August 2014, only 135 hosts have
requested permits even though 1,600 hosts are listed on Airbnb alone.242
IV. FUTURE OPTIONS FOR REGULATION
The legal literature has been largely silent on how to regulate the shar-
ing economy, and what scant offerings there have been thus far243 have not
offered much detail on how a proposed scheme of regulation might seek to
address the concerns announced above as “first principles” for regulating
241 John Tato, Cities Grapple with the Challenges of Regulating Short-Term Rentals,
ECORONADO.COM (July 24, 2015), http://ecoronado.com/news/2015/07/24/cities-grapple-with-
the-challenges-of-regulating-short-term-rentals/ [http://perma.cc/N5TT-HC3C].
242 Id.
243 See, e.g., Emily Badger, Why We Can’t Figure Out How to Regulate Airbnb, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/
04/23/why-we-cant-figure-out-how-to-regulate-airbnb/ [http://perma.cc/9SV8-9955]; Eric Bi-
ber & J.B. Ruhl, Regulating the “Sharing Economy”, REGBLOG.COM (July 28, 2014), http://
www.regblog.org/2014/07/28/28-biber-ruhl-regulating-the-sharing-economy/ [http://perma.cc/
4LBJ-PWBC]; Shari Shapiro, Firms in Sharing Economy Should be Regulated Under a Modi-
fied Framework, REGBLOG.COM (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.regblog.org/2014/09/02/02-sha-
piro-regulating-sharing-economy-under-modified-framework/ [http://perma.cc/6FZ9-4YHY].
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the sharing economy. The tentativeness with which the legal literature has
approached regulating the sharing economy is understandable; the sharing
economy is shifting so many of our assumptions about daily life that an
attempt to lay down hard-and-fast rules would be a fool’s errand. Nonethe-
less, it seems worthwhile to at least imagine a theoretical framework that
might respond to the whole ambit of first principles announced in Part II.
One attempt to do so is outlined below, in this section’s proposal of a trans-
ferable sharing rights marketplace.
A. A Proposal for the STR Market: Transferable Sharing Rights
The STR Market, which operates illegally in most cities,244 is a disrup-
tive technology that threatens long-standing business models of hotels as
well as regulatory structures, tax bases, and constituencies of local govern-
ments. This section introduces a regulatory framework to legalize the short-
term rental market, while also addressing its externalities, referred to here as
“transferable sharing rights,” or TSRs. Even if implementation of a TSR
regime as proposed here proved politically or logistically impracticable, the
proposal is intended to provoke and invite discussion on alternative methods
for regulating the short-term rental market and other aspects of the sharing
economy.
The TSR model is based on existing transfer of development rights
(“TDR”) regimes perfected over the last fifty years in commercial develop-
ment contexts.245 TDRs became popular after their explicit approval in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York246 as a way to compensate
property owners who were required to maintain a less intense use than other-
wise permitted by code, such as the historic Grand Central Terminal in Man-
hattan. In TDR regimes, this down-zoned “sending” site is permitted to sell
its unused development rights to a “receiving site” for a market price, which
then permits the receiving site to develop more intensely than otherwise per-
mitted by code by a prescribed amount. This proposal for TSRs follows the
example of TDR regimes in their more successful iterations while also draw-
ing on a variety of other land use tools, such as impact fees, already used
extensively across the country.
A transferable sharing rights regime for the short-term rental market
could be structured as follows:
Allocating TSRs. As with any artificial marketplace, designing the ini-
tial allocation of TSRs is of utmost concern. One easy approach would be to
provide each dwelling unit within the city a redeemable transferable sharing
244 See, e.g., Leonard Greene, Airbnb Nets $40M in Illegal NY Listings: AG, N.Y. POST
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/10/16/airbnb-nets-40m-in-illegal-ny-listings-schneid-
erman/ [http://perma.cc/D4QN-HJDG].
245 See generally ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., THE TDR HANDBOOK (2011).
246 438 U.S. 104, 114 (1978).
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right, or TSR, which would permit the dwelling unit owner to engage in a
short-term rental for a given period of time. The term of a TSR should vary
depending upon the tourism market in each city, for example by limiting the
number of persons or number of days allowed.
Redeeming a TSR. A TSR has no value, and conveys no right, unless
redeemed pursuant to terms established by the city for TSRs. An owner of
the dwelling unit would use an Internet platform controlled by the city to
redeem a TSR.247 Redeeming a TSR should have two components. First, it
should require information that allows the city to further refine its response
to the short-term rental market. This could include data such as: location of
rental; length of stay; price charged; and number of visitors. Second, TSR
redemption should require payment of a TSR Fee.
The TSR Fee. The TSR Fee is equal to a monetization of externalities
arising from the operation of short-term rental markets. In this regard, the
TSR Fee is no different from an impact fee that is applied to new develop-
ment to pay for that project’s externalities. The city would be required to
conduct a nexus study, similar to an impact fee nexus study, to evaluate the
impacts on the city of permitting the short-term rental market. Possible im-
pacts may include increased police, health and safety, fire, building depart-
ment, and TSR compliance enforcement services. In addition, the TSR Fee
study could also evaluate foregone hotel occupancy taxes and any other
costs or fees lost by the city to the short-term rental market. Collection of the
TSR Fee would place the city in the same position it was in prior to the
arrival of the short-term rental market.
The right of a redeemed TSR. Upon completing the TSR redemption,
the TSR Owner could then engage in a short-term rental for the term of the
TSR without regard to other limitations imposed by the city, including those
that might otherwise prohibit the short-term rental market, such as zoning,
building, or fire codes.
TSR Fee passed on to consumer. Impact fees imposed on developers of
new construction can be passed on to the purchasers of the new units.248
Here, the TSR Fee would most likely be passed on to the consumer through
the rental rate for the short-term rental. In time, sites like Airbnb, would
likely reflect the TSR Fee in the advertised price for the short-term rental.
Alienability of TSRs. TSRs would be alienable from the dwelling unit.
TSRs must be alienable from the dwelling unit to which they are allocated in
order to facilitate the creation of a market for the TSRs.
The TSR Market. A TSR Market would permit those that do not wish to
use TSRs to sell them to others who want to engage in the short-term market
beyond their initial allocation. Unredeemed TSRs could be sold through an
247 The site described here would likely utilize the same technology needed for the TSR
Market described below.
248 See, e.g., Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE 139, 161
(2005) (discussing this phenomenon in the context of home prices).
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online marketplace, the TSR Market, controlled by the city. The city needs
to have control over the TSR Market to ensure market transparency. It is
especially important that the city retain control of the TSR Market in order
to ensure (i) that proper records are maintained of the redemption of and sale
of unredeemed TSRs, and (ii) that aggregators cannot manipulate the mar-
ket, both of which have been problems in poorly designed TDR market-
places. While it is important for the city to retain control of the TSR Market,
it could also be operated on the back-end by existing Internet sites. For in-
stance, a site like StubHub, which facilitates the resale of sporting event and
concert tickets, already provides the type of market platform necessary to
enable a TSR Market. Such companies could be incentivized to offer their
technology to cities for free upfront by, in turn, receiving a small percentage
of each redeemed TSR. Presumably, it would be easy for such third-party
providers to quickly commodify the TSR Market software through deploy-
ment in major cities, which would then drive down the cost of implementa-
tion in smaller cities.
Avoiding market manipulation. Only dwelling unit owners should be
permitted to purchase TSRs; otherwise, institutional players, such as hotels,
might try to purchase TSRs to manipulate the market. Preventing market
manipulation is another reason to limit the number of TSRs that any one
dwelling unit can utilize.
Necessity of scarcity. If the TSR Market is designed properly, there will
be scarcity in TSR “receiving” areas—locations where tourists want to
stay—and a surplus in TSR “sending” areas—locations where tourists don’t
want to stay. This is perhaps the most important part of designing a TSR
Market: if there are too many TSRs allocated initially, no market will
emerge, which eliminates the rest of the marketplace’s benefits in reducing
externalities outlined below. It may be that scarcity necessitates multiple
TSRs to permit one short-term rental, a calculus that could be performed
with some precision given knowledge of a city’s typical tourism and dwell-
ing unit data.
In addition, TSRs would also need to have an effective date; for in-
stance, non-redeemed TSRs might be issued on January 1 of a given year
and voided after December 31 of that same year. This is equally necessary to
preserve market scarcity.
The TSR Market Demand Fee. The TSR Market is where TSR sending
and receiving sites meet to determine the price of an alienable, unredeemed
TSR. If designed correctly, the market price for TSRs on the TSR Market
would be in excess of the TSR Fee. The TSR seller and the city would split
the TSR Market Demand Fee.
Neighborhood benefits from the TSR Market Demand Fee. The portion
of the TSR Market Demand Fee that is retained by the city should then be
allocated in a manner that seeks to mitigate the externalities of the short-
term rental market. One possibility is to give the city’s share of the TSR
Market Demand Fee to neighborhood groups in those locations where the
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bulk of TSRs are used. The money could be used at the discretion of neigh-
borhood groups to permit them to improve their neighborhood and thereby
reap some benefit from increased tourism.
Preventing TSR hot-spots. To prevent “hot-spots” of short-term rental
markets from changing the character of a building or neighborhood, the city
could limit the number of TSRs that a dwelling unit could use in a given
period. In addition, the city could limit the number of TSRs that are used in a
desirable neighborhood. This approach may also eliminate the concern of
some that short-term rentals raise rents.249 The limit on TSRs should be suffi-
ciently high to permit the TSR Market to operate, but sufficiently low to
retain residential character of city neighborhoods. This limit may vary by
neighborhood. For instance, some neighborhoods may come to covet the fi-
nancial gain that they would receive through their share of the TSR Market
Demand Fee, and thus want a higher TSR threshold in that neighborhood,
while other neighborhoods may not be incentivized by such financial
reward.
Economic development. Once a TSR Market is properly established, the
city could use the market as an economic development tool. For instance, the
city could begin requiring multiple TSRs to stay in fashionable areas, while
areas where the city seeks to encourage economic development would re-
quire fewer TSRs. Of course, the city would want to engage the community
to ensure there was support for driving growth to an area, but such an incen-
tive would flow both to individual dwelling unit owners and to the neighbor-
hood at large through the neighborhood’s share of the TSR Market Demand
Fee.
Enforcement. Enforcement of TSR compliance could take several ap-
proaches. First, the city could use its traditional nuisance abatement power to
respond to citizen complaints of non-TSR-enabled short-term rentals. Re-
sidents could be empowered to assist nuisance abatement efforts by access to
information about redeemed TSRs within a relevant area, such as 300-feet
around a building or, more broadly, within a neighborhood. Such data on
redeemed TSRs would need to be sufficiently specific to inform residents,
but also sufficiently vague to protect the privacy and safety of the visitors.
Second, monetary fines for non-compliance would be essential. The fine
would need to be sufficiently high to discourage an “efficient breach” in
which short-term rentals proceed without TSRs and simply pay the fine. In
addition, the city could encourage enforcement by providing for citizen suits
through the local city code that would reimburse attorney fees, costs, a por-
tion of the monetary fine, and even a multiplier on attorney fees to reward
the public benefit, where citizens bring to light TSR abuse.
However, there are three major problems with a TSR approach to the
short-term rental market that should be resolved.
249 See supra Part II.I.
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Landlords and renters. This proposal gives the TSR to the dwelling unit
owner. Complications will emerge between landlords and renters. Cities
should preemptively address these issues. For instance, a city ordinance
could require landlords to permit renters to use TSRs allocated to the dwell-
ing unit; if left to private negotiation, standard forms used in most rental
agreements would likely eliminate renters’ access to TSRs. A city ordinance
could also state that use of TSRs by renters does not otherwise violate sub-
letting or rent control provisions.
Large condominium buildings or homeowners associations would also
likely revise their bylaws to address TSRs. Such private agreements could
limit the use of TSRs within a building or neighborhood, just as such bylaws
already provide additional restrictions on those communities today. If such
limitations were pursued in large number, it could affect the market price of
the TSR Fee and the TSR Market Demand Fee, which the city could then re-
adjust from time-to-time, just as cities readjust their impact fee schedules.
Labor unions. Hotel-based labor unions are major opponents of the
short-term rental market because such unions fear the loss of union jobs if
the hotels in which they work go out of business. Cities with labor issues
could consider using some portion of the TSR Market Demand Fee to pro-
vide worker training, or subsidize benefits, for those workers who would be
affected by the rise of the short-term rental market.
Jurisdictionality. TSRs raise the cost of short-term rentals, and so those
seeking bargains might choose to stay just over the city border in a neighbor-
ing city that does not charge a TSR. This result is a persistent problem in
local government law and, incidentally, is currently a persistent issue with
existing hotels and hotel occupancy taxes. Nonetheless, if a TSR Market
becomes commodified by a third-party provider, as proposed above, then
even small jurisdictions could charge TSRs. Absent transaction costs, all
cities have an incentive to charge TSRs because, like hotel occupancy taxes,
they would be paid by transient populations that do not vote. Thus, a TSR
Fee is a valuable way to raise revenue without raising taxes on voters for all
cities.
Overall, a transferable sharing rights regime appears uniquely capable
of addressing many of the complexities, and externalities, arising from the
short-term rental market. The implementation of such a regime may, at first,
seem onerous. It should not. Existing Internet platforms already deploy the
technologies needed to establish and maintain the TSR Market, which could
be repurposed to this end.
V. CONCLUSION: THE ESTABLISHED MARKETS’ ENDGAME
The sharing economy is changing quickly, thus complicating a clear
regulatory response. This section reviews several major trends occurring in
the sharing economy right now, and then evaluates how those changes will
affect the future of regulatory responses.
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There is perhaps no bigger question in the sharing economy than how
the established market participants will respond to the disrupting web plat-
forms. In many industries, the importance of Internet platforms to estab-
lished, brick-and-mortar businesses is now well understood.250 These
established market participants are now seeking ways to either retain ex-
isting market share by repositioning the purchase of their products through
“sharing,” or are trying to find ways to enter the new markets created by the
sharing economy platforms.
A recent study underscores the importance for established markets to
adapt to sharing economies. First, the study found that most people share
because of convenience and price, but they associate qualities like sus-
tainability and community with sharing services more than they do with re-
tail stores. Urban centers, where most wealth is located, “are more likely to
contain people who have borrowed or lent vehicles and money,” and “more
than 90% of sharers surveyed said they would recommend the service they
most recently used.”251 Another study by an arm of the consulting firm
Deloitte found that venture capital firms have invested more than $2 billion
in over 500 collaborative economy ventures globally since 2012. The study
also reported that “40 percent of North American adults used a collaborative
commerce service in 2013” and that “dozens of major brands and tech firms
have joined a ‘brand council’ to develop strategies for the collaborative
economy.”252 Sharing is no longer an idiosyncratic pursuit; it is now a main-
stream manner of consumption.
The STR Market has seen a similar influx of large-scale efforts to infil-
trate the new markets opened up in neighborhoods. In Los Angeles, a city
council member recently noted that “commercial ventures have purchased
large numbers of rental units or even entire apartment buildings and con-
verted them into de facto hotels, reducing and threatening the city’s stock of
rental housing and affordable housing, and that is wrong.”253 In New York
City, the State’s Attorney General found commercial enterprises were using
Airbnb to operate multimillion-dollar businesses and, in one instance, a sin-
gle commercial user made $6.8 million in less than five years.254
The perception of sharing, however, has not caught up with the rapid
corporatization of the pursuit in the STR Market or the sharing economy
250 Darrell Rigby, Digital-Physical Mashups, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014, at 86 (“[T]he
greatest barrier to adopting fusion strategies [between physical stores and corporate web plat-
forms] is not skepticism about their promise but inexperience with their execution.”).
251 Ariel Schwartz, The Collaborative Economy Is Exploding, And Brands That Ignore It
Are Out Of Luck, CO.EXIST (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3027062/the-collabo-
rative-economy-is-exploding-and-brands-that-ignore-it-are-out-of-luck [http://perma.cc/
NWU3-JDCS].
252 Vikram Mahidhar & David Schatsky, Big Companies Now Have a Hand in the Collab-
orative Economy, DELOITTE U. PRESS (May 5, 2014), http://dupress.com/articles/collaborative-
economy/ [http://perma.cc/Y8E3-P5TU].
253 Martin, supra note 155. R
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generally. Looking forward, those tasked with creating regulatory structures
for the sharing economy face a daunting task: not only must they find regu-
lations that comport with the first principles previously espoused in this Arti-
cle, but they must also find a delicate balance between prioritizing
individuals’ desires to engage in the sharing economy and corporate interests
in the sharing economy. The differences between individual and corporate
interests are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish as the sharing
economy matures. Whether the seeming future coalescence of personal in-
terests and corporate profits affects the nature of regulation remains to be
seen. It is incumbent on regulators to understand the evolution of the indus-
try and understand who and what it is they are regulating.
Is the future of the STR Market a couple of young roomies trying to
earn a little extra cash to pay the rent, as Airbnb’s founding mission purports,
or is it Marriott trying to edge its way into cities’ most treasured neighbor-
hoods? Should it matter?
These questions do not have good answers today, but this Article has
sought to at least announce a starting point from which to consider a regula-
tory response. The hope is that this beginning will lead to a more nuanced
conversation on regulation that might, in time, provide a legal space for the
sharing economy within our cities, while still protecting the sense of place
that makes residents want to call a place home and travelers want to return.
